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INTRODUCTION
Family law in the United States has long embraced the image of a
triangle to describe the allocation of legal authority over childrearing.
Parents, children, and the state stand at the three points of this trian1
gle. Much of family law concerns when parental authority over children should trump state interests, when state interests should trump
parental authority, and when children’s own rights should trump either. Although struggles over authority remain, a general principle
has long been clear: absent abuse or other forms of perceived family
2
default, parents enjoy almost complete authority over their children
†
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1
See, e.g., ROBERT H. MNOOKIN & D. KELLY WEISBERG, CHILD, FAMILY, AND STATE:
PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS ON CHILDREN AND THE LAW 795 (5th ed. 2005) (referring to
“the triangular relationship between the child, the family, and the state”); Catherine J.
Ross, Anything Goes: Examining the State’s Interest in Protecting Children from Controversial
Speech, 53 VAND. L. REV. 427, 435 (2000) (discussing “perpetual stresses along three
sides of a triangle with endpoints labeled PCS: Parent, Child, and State”); Barbara
Bennett Woodhouse, Ecogenerism: An Environmentalist Approach to Protecting Endangered
Children, 12 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 409, 422 (2005) (“As a teacher of constitutional and
family law for over fifteen years, I have illustrated the tensions between parents, children and the state with a triangular diagram.”).
2
Such default can include poverty, poverty-related neglect, and divorce. See MIMI
ABRAMOVITZ, REGULATING THE LIVES OF WOMEN: SOCIAL WELFARE POLICY FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE PRESENT 313-14, 349-53 (1988) (discussing how families receiving financial assistance from the state are subject to strict state control); Clare Hunt-

(833)

834

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 155: 833

at home, whereas the state may exercise authority over children at
school by mandating school attendance and regulating educational
curricula—even those of private and home schools. With limited ex3
ceptions, children have few rights in either realm.
This settled equilibrium ignores a fundamental reality: children
are not confined to home and school. Much of childhood takes place
in spaces between home and school: in playgrounds, parks, child care
centers, churches, community gyms, sporting fields, dance studios,
music rooms, after-school clubs, and cyberspace. Family law has been
4
virtually silent about what happens or should happen in these spaces.
Either the childrearing that takes place in them is ignored altogether,
or it is seen as an extension of the childrearing that takes place in ei5
ther home or school, obscuring the distinct childrearing that can be
ington, Rights Myopia in Child Welfare, 53 UCLA L. REV. 637, 667-70 (2006) (discussing
some states’ frequent practice of removing children from their parents’ care because
of poverty-related neglect not involving physical abuse); David D. Meyer, The Paradox of
Family Privacy, 53 VAND. L. REV. 527, 581 (2000) (“Never-married or divorced parents
are subjected to state investigation and direction on a scale that would be considered
unthinkable in the context of married parents in an intact family.”).
3
See Emily Buss, Allocating Developmental Control Among Parent, Child and the State,
2004 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 27, 29 (“The competition for developmental control of a child is
classically framed as a competition between parent and state.”).
4
Notable exceptions can be found in the work of Barbara Bennett Woodhouse
and Kenneth Karst, both of whom have discussed how children are influenced by the
media and advertising industries. See, e.g., Kenneth L. Karst, Law, Cultural Conflict, and
the Socialization of Children, 91 CAL. L. REV. 967, 1002-11 (2003); Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Reframing the Debate About the Socialization of Children: An Environmentalist Paradigm, 2004 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 85, 97-119. For more discussion of Woodhouse’s and
Karst’s work, see infra text accompanying notes 56-62. Other scholars have criticized
the simplicity of the triangle model, but those scholars have limited their analysis to
the context of abuse and neglect. See, e.g., Susan Vivian Mangold, Challenging the Parent-Child-State Triangle in Public Family Law: The Importance of Private Providers in the Dependency System, 47 BUFF. L. REV. 1397, 1400 (1999) (criticizing the triangle as “an incomplete model for the complexity of family law, especially as it applies to abused and
neglected children in the dependency system”); Ellen Marrus, Fostering Family Ties: The
State as Maker and Breaker of Kinship Relationships, 2004 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 319, 351 (“The
triangle of state, parent, and child that is usually invoked in family matters is too simplistic. It fails to reflect that the child has family connections, such as siblings, beyond
the parent-child relationship.”).
5
See, e.g., LINDA C. MCCLAIN, THE PLACE OF FAMILIES: FOSTERING CAPACITY,
EQUALITY, AND RESPONSIBILITY 24 (2006) (discussing “neighborhood organizations
[that] provide after-school and athletic programs for children” as examples of “institutions of civil society” that “may also play a vital role in shaping and supporting families”); Woodhouse, supra note 4, at 86 (“The traditional paradigm pitting parents
against the state is deeply rooted in American family jurisprudence. On one side . . .
are parents and the private institutions—from soccer clubs to churches to boot camps
for defiant teens—that families deputize as their agents in guiding their children’s development and instilling in their children the values that they hold dear.”).
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performed between home and school by individuals other than parents, state actors, or children themselves. The triangle thus remains
intact, and the spaces and actors between and around its three points
are rendered invisible.
This Article explores what it would mean for family law to consider explicitly all of the sites of childrearing, the actors who occupy
those sites, and the types of childrearing that take place at those sites.
Part I draws upon social science literature to identify the diverse
spaces of childhood and the actors who socialize children in those
spaces. The social science literature confirms that home and school
are indeed important sites of childrearing, but that children are also
socialized in other spaces by various actors. The identity of those actors, and the degree of their influence, varies from child to child in
ways that may correlate to class, race, geography, religion, gender, or
parental philosophy. The important common denominator, however,
is that the actors in these other spaces are rarely the children’s parents
or teachers. The social science literature reveals that children know
that they are interacting with actors who are neither their parents nor
their teachers—and that they respond differently than they would either at home or at school.
The current scope of family law implies that childrearing between
home and school is not important to child socialization. The social
science literature refutes this inference, explaining the vital roles that
such childrearing plays in child development. It is not only social scientists, however, who have noticed the importance of childrearing
that occurs between home and school. Though such childrearing has
been largely ignored within family law scholarship, it played a pivotal
role in a high-profile Supreme Court case: Boy Scouts of America v.
6
Dale. Dale was not a family law case, nor was it framed as otherwise
concerning childrearing, but the central question presented was who
may control messages conveyed to boys during Boy Scout activities,
conducted in various spaces other than home or school. The Boy
Scouts argued that it had a First Amendment right to choose, free
from state regulation, the adults who help the organization instill val7
ues in boys. James Dale, a troop leader who was expelled from the
Boy Scouts after the organization learned he was gay, argued that the
Boy Scouts was subject to New Jersey’s public accommodations law,
which prohibits private organizations like the Boy Scouts from dis6
7

530 U.S. 640 (2000).
Id. at 644, 653.
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criminating on the basis of sexual orientation. The Supreme Court
sided with the Boy Scouts, holding that the organization was entitled
9
to teach by example the values of heterosexuality. The case thus provides an opportunity to begin a legal exploration of the childrearing
that exists between and around the three points of the family law triangle.
Part II proceeds to provide a family law reading of the Dale case,
situating the holding in relation to family law’s traditional approaches
to questions concerning the allocation of childrearing authority. Although many commentators already have analyzed Dale, this Article
provides the first analysis from a family law perspective. Analogizing
the Boy Scouts’s activities to those performed by parents within the
home provides support for the Supreme Court’s decision, as parents
also are given much room to instill values in their children free from
state regulation. Analogizing the Boy Scouts’s activities to those performed at school provides support for the opposite result, because
even private schools are subject to state regulations prohibiting discrimination. These conflicting outcomes indicate that analogies to
home and school can be of limited utility when analyzing childrearing
that takes place between home and school.
Part III therefore calls for a theory that acknowledges childrearing
between home and school for what it is, as opposed to how it is similar
to the childrearing that takes place at either home or school. Such a
theory initially would not have to call for state regulation, or for nonregulation, in the spaces between home and school. Rather, the very
acknowledgment of this childrearing could contribute to existing attempts within family law to better reflect the reality of family life. Beyond better reflecting the reality of family life, acknowledging this
childrearing could also reshape aspects of family life. Family law’s neglect of this childrearing, however benign, necessarily shapes family
behavior to some extent: home and school are salient to parents and
children in part because these are the spaces subject to explicit state
regulation or nonregulation. Legal acknowledgment of the spaces between home and school could allow these other spaces to take on
some of the socialization that is currently thought to be properly performed only at home or school.
Once childrearing between home and school is acknowledged,
family law scholars could begin to address how the law should respond
8
9

Id. at 645.
Id. at 659.
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to various attempts by parents, the state, and other actors to exert control over childrearing activities occurring in the spaces between home
and school. Family law’s current silence about this childrearing could
reflect, by default, a normative view of parental control over children
in all spaces but school. Pursuant to such a view, family privacy is not
limited to the home, but rather attaches to the childrearing function—even when that function is performed outside of the home or
performed by parental surrogates instead of parents themselves. If
family law scholars do in fact support this view, it would be useful to
have its rationale explicitly articulated, particularly because courts do
not always reinforce parental control in the spaces between home and
school. Indeed, various cases have upheld state regulations that temper parents’ authority when their children are between home and
school. These cases challenge the idea that there is broad support for
a normative view that parents should control such childrearing.
The last Section of Part III posits the beginnings of an alternative
normative approach to childrearing between home and school, one
that supports parental prerogatives yet also calls on states to ensure
that children are exposed to diverse ways of life in these spaces. This
proposed theory is grounded in the value of liberal pluralism that
permeates much of family law, but the theory also seeks to promote
pluralism within the family. Childrearing between home and school
thus becomes the exclusive domain of neither parents nor the state,
but rather is acknowledged as a vital part of civil society and is sustained accordingly. Finally, Part IV offers a brief conclusion highlighting how this theory of childrearing might affect some of the foundational normative positions of family law as a whole.
I. THE SPACES OF CHILDHOOD
Much of family law revolves around children. For example, states
10
specify who may be legal parents, the minimum level of care those
11
parents must provide, and the consequences for failing to meet that
10

For discussions of the various ways the states currently determine parental
status, see June Carbone, The Legal Definition of Parenthood: Uncertainty at the Core of
Family Identity, 65 LA. L. REV. 1295, 1314-32 (2005); David D. Meyer, Parenthood in a
Time of Transition: Tensions Between Legal, Biological, and Social Conceptions of Parenthood,
54 AM. J. COMP. L. 125, 132-43 (2006).
11
See, e.g., Katharine T. Bartlett, Rethinking Parenthood as an Exclusive Status: The
Need for Legal Alternatives when the Premise of the Nuclear Family Has Failed, 70 VA. L. REV.
879, 885 (1984) (“Parents must care for their child, support him financially, see to his
education, and provide him proper medical care. They have the duty to control the
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12

standard. It is thus not surprising that family law’s approach to children focuses largely on the allocation of childrearing authority between parents and the state. This focus is reflected in the titles of
casebooks, such as Children, Parents, and The Law: Public and Private
13
Authority in the Home, Schools, and Juvenile Courts and Child, Family, and
14
State, as well as in casebook chapter headings like “Allocating Power
15
over Children: Parental Rights and State Authority.” The focus is
also reflected in family law scholarship, with law review articles entitled Medical Decision Making for and by Children: Tensions Between Parent,
16
State, and Child and Allocating Developmental Control Among Parent,
17
Child and the State or containing section headings like “The Place of
18
Children in a Dispute Between Parents and the State” and “The Ver19
tical Context: Protecting Families Against the Government.”
Recent law review articles, both explicitly within family law and
not, continue this trend. For example, Anne Dailey argues that family
law should embrace a developmental approach to childrearing because that approach maintains that the early parent-child relationship,
rather than school curricula controlled by the state, plays the determinative role in cultivating democratic skills and values in young peo-

child, and if they fail in this duty, they may be required to answer for the child’s
wrongdoings.” (footnotes omitted)); Leslie J. Harris et al., Making and Breaking Connections Between Parents’ Duty To Support and Right To Control Their Children, 69 OR. L. REV.
689, 693-96, 702-09 (1990) (describing how “during the nineteenth century American
courts and legislatures established that under the private law, parents have a legal duty
to support their children” and delineating current obligations in the “intact family”
and “the family following divorce”).
12
Namely, states may exercise jurisdiction over children when they are abused or
neglected by their parents. Definitions of abuse and neglect vary from state to state,
but all hinge on default of parental duties. See, e.g., Woodhouse, supra note 1, at 423
(“Provision of services and support [by the state] is the exception to the rule of autonomy, and generally must be tied to some finding or admission of family failure and
dysfunction. . . . Thus, the model depends on parental fault as a predicate for state engagement in the life of the child.”).
13
LESLIE J. HARRIS & LEE E. TEITELBAUM, CHILDREN, PARENTS AND THE LAW: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE AUTHORITY IN THE HOME, SCHOOLS, AND JUVENILE COURTS (2002).
14
MNOOKIN & WEISBERG, supra note 1.
15
SAMUEL M. DAVIS ET AL., CHILDREN IN THE LEGAL SYSTEM: CASES AND MATERIALS 1 (3rd ed. 2004).
16
Walter Wadlington, Medical Decision Making for and by Children: Tensions Between
Parent, State, and Child, 1994 U. ILL. L. REV. 311, 311.
17
Buss, supra note 3, at 27.
18
Janet L. Dolgin, The Fate of Childhood: Legal Models of Children and the Parent-Child
Relationship, 61 ALB. L. REV. 345, 383 (1998).
19
Jane Rutherford, Beyond Individual Privacy: A New Theory of Family Rights, 39 U.
FLA. L. REV. 627, 644 (1987).
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20

ple. A similar focus on allocating power between parents and the
state can be found in a recent article by First Amendment scholar
Eugene Volokh, who argues that parents in both “intact” and “split”
families should have First Amendment rights to speak to their children free from state restrictions imposed pursuant to a “best interests
21
of the child” custody standard.
This focus on the appropriate allocation of childrearing authority
between parents and the state reflects a deep concern about the socialization of children. Family law doctrine and scholarship empha22
size that, although families are major sites for socializing children,
states also play a socializing role by mandating school attendance, setting curricular standards, adjudicating custody disputes, and specifying the minimum requirements for childrearing within the home.
Debate continues within family law about where to draw the line between parental and state authority, but three aspects of family law discourse have remained constant.
First, parents and the state exercise authority over children. This
authority often is illustrated by inverting family law’s triangle image
and positioning parents and the state at the top two points and children at the bottom point. This orientation of the triangle emphasizes
that children are rarely given power to control their own destinies, but
23
rather are subject to the decisions of either their parents or the state.
Parents and the states exercise different types of authority, however;
parents exercise private power over children, whereas the states exercise public power. Therefore, other scholars flip the triangle back on
its base, placing the state at the apex and parents and children at the

20

Anne C. Dailey, Developing Citizens, 91 IOWA L. REV. 431, 482–88 (2006) (arguing
that “early caregiving” provides the optimal preconditions for developing children’s
capacities for “personal choice and democratic participation”).
21
Eugene Volokh, Parent-Child Speech and Child Custody Speech Restrictions, 81 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 631, 712-21 (2006) (asserting that such restrictions violate the “parents’ selfexpression interests and the children’s interests as hearers”).
22
See, e.g., Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925) (“The child is not the
mere creature of the State; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the
right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations.”); Woodhouse, supra note 1, at 409 (“Families not only nurture and protect children, but they also teach them to be citizens of a larger society.”).
23
See, e.g., Ira C. Lupu, The Separation of Powers and the Protection of Children, 61 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1317, 1318 (1994) (describing how disputes involving children are not in
fact triangular but instead are “legally bilateral” because “the conflicts primarily involve the state and the mediating entity—the family or other custodian—without the
independent, autonomous voice of the child being heard in the formal legal controversies”).
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24

bottom two points. This conception emphasizes that children exist
with their parents in the lower, private realm, and that the state
crosses into that “zone of privacy” only to further public goals, such as
citizenship development and the protection of children’s general welfare; otherwise, parents have control over “personal values and
25
choices regarding children’s development.”
Regardless of the orientation of family law’s triangle image, the
three points of the triangle remain constant. This is the second point
of agreement within family law discourse: that parents and the state
are the primary, if not the only, actors who engage in the socialization
26
of children. Other actors are not part of the triangle, symbolizing
the importance of parents and the state, as well as highlighting the
law’s exclusion of other parties who could, and often do, influence
27
children.
The final constant aspect of family law discourse spatially situates
the socialization of children, at home and at school. Although this
aspect of the discourse is often less explicit than the first two points of
agreement, it flows naturally from those points of agreement. If parents and the state are the primary actors who engage in the socialization of children, and parents have authority over private matters,
while the state has authority over public matters, then parents generally exert influence over children when they are at home, whereas the
state generally can reach children only when they are at school and
thus subject to state educational policies.
Scholars in other disciplines also have studied the location of
child socialization. Most notably, sociologists and social geographers

24

Barbara Bennett Woodhouse follows this approach. See Woodhouse, supra note
1, at 423; Woodhouse, supra note 4, at 88.
25
Woodhouse, supra note 4, at 88; see also Woodhouse, supra note 1, at 423 (“As
depicted in this diagram, the most salient fact about the relation of the family and the
state is that authority over children is allocated to the private sphere of the family. It
suggests that children only have a relationship with the state when the wall of family
privacy has been pierced.”).
26
For another example of this focus, see MCCLAIN, supra note 5, at 70 (stating that
her approach “accepts the dual authority of parents and schools to nurture children’s
capacities” because “[p]arents educate children about what it means to be part of a
particular way of life; schools, through cultivating skills of critical reflection and perspective-taking, help children learn that there are other ways of life deserving of respect”).
27
Cf. Buss, supra note 3, at 29 (stating that family law’s traditional view of the
“competition for developmental control of a child . . . oversimplifies the field of potential competitors considerably”).
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have increasingly examined the spaces of childhood. This literature,
much like family law doctrine and scholarship, acknowledges that
home and school remain important sites for the socialization of chil29
dren. Nonetheless, the social science literature emphasizes that socialization also takes place in many other spaces, including public
spaces such as municipal playgrounds, sports fields, and parks, as well
as private spaces like churches, clubs, day care centers, and other loca30
tions of various after-school instruction.
That such spaces exist is common sense for most of us. Their importance may not be. These spaces often have been viewed as mere
holding areas between home and school—as spaces of childcare or
recreation, as opposed to spaces of child socialization or childrearing.
The focus of family law tends to support such a view. The failure of
most family law scholars to consider any spaces of child socialization
other than home and school could suggest that these scholars believe
that little meaningful socialization takes place outside of those two locations. The remainder of this Part first shows how social science literature refutes this suggestion; it then examines the legal implications
of that literature.
A. Social Science Insights
Social science studies reveal that the spaces between home and
school are far from meaningless. Instead, such spaces have func-

28

For examples of social scientists’ examinations of the spaces of childhood,
see STUART C. AITKEN, FAMILY FANTASIES AND COMMUNITY SPACE 94-104 (1998); STUART C. AITKEN, GEOGRAPHIES OF YOUNG PEOPLE: THE MORALLY CONTESTED SPACES OF
IDENTITY 1-26 (2001); CHILDREN IN THE CITY: HOME, NEIGHBOURHOOD AND COMMUNITY (Pia Christensen & Margaret O’Brien eds., 2003); CHILDREN’S GEOGRAPHIES:
PLAYING, LIVING, LEARNING (Sarah L. Holloway & Gill Valentine eds., 2000); COOL
PLACES: GEOGRAPHIES OF YOUTH CULTURES (Tracey Skelton & Gill Valentine eds.,
1998); ALLISON JAMES ET AL., THEORIZING CHILDHOOD 37-58 (1998); ANNETTE
LAREAU, UNEQUAL CHILDHOODS: CLASS, RACE, AND FAMILY LIFE 14-32, 165-97 (2003);
CHRISTOPHER SPENCER ET AL., THE CHILD IN THE PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT: THE DEVELOPMENT OF SPATIAL KNOWLEDGE AND COGNITION 3-11 (1989).
29
See, e.g., Sarah L. Holloway & Gill Valentine, Spatiality and the New Social Studies of
Childhood, 34 SOC. 763, 770-76 (2000) (describing the relative effects of school and the
home on the socialization of children).
30
See, e.g., Sarah L. Holloway & Gill Valentine, Children’s Geographies and the New
Social Studies of Childhood, in CHILDREN’S GEOGRAPHIES, supra note 28, at 1, 19-20 (introducing various academic perspectives on the importance of geography in the socialization of children); see also supra note 28 (referencing a sampling of the social science literature that explores the spaces of child socialization).
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tioned as more than places of play or childcare in the past, and they
continue to play a vital role in children’s socialization today. Studies
of these spaces are complex, and an exhaustive review of all of their
aspects is beyond the scope of this Article. Even so, the social science
literature suggests that spaces between home and school contribute to
the socialization of children in at least three important ways.
First, the social science literature emphasizes that childhood, although rooted in biological age, is also a social construction, consti32
tuted both structurally and through daily practice. In the Western
33
world, much of this daily practice occurs at home and at school, as
family law scholars have emphasized. Nonetheless, the spaces between
home and school also are vital to this daily practice. These “between”
spaces are important in part because children actually spend time in

31

See, e.g., LAWRENCE A. CREMIN, AMERICAN EDUCATION: THE METROPOLITAN EX1876-1980, at 273 (1988) (describing a “broader configuration of education”
that had developed by the 1870s, consisting of “Sunday schools, academies, colleges,
seminaries, publishing houses, libraries, almshouses, orphan asylums, reformatories,
and the churches themselves”); Elizabeth A. Gagen, Playing the Part: Performing Gender
in America’s Playgrounds, in CHILDREN’S GEOGRAPHIES, supra note 28, at 213, 216-17
(discussing the “playground movement” in Cambridge, Massachusetts, at the end of
the nineteenth century).
32
Thus, childhood is not a naturally occurring state, but rather is an “actively negotiated set of social relationships.” Alan Prout & Allison James, A New Paradigm for the
Sociology of Childhood? Provenance, Promise and Problems, in CONSTRUCTING AND RECONSTRUCTING CHILDHOOD: CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN THE SOCIOLOGICAL STUDY OF
CHILDHOOD 7, 7 (Allison James & Alan Prout eds., 1990). Indeed, conceptions and
articulations of immaturity have varied across cultures and time. See, e.g., PHILIPPE
ARIÈS, CENTURIES OF CHILDHOOD: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF FAMILY LIFE 15-133 (Robert
Baldick trans., Alfred A. Knopf 1962) (1960) (tracing the development of the “idea of
childhood” over time); Holloway & Valentine, supra note 30, at 2-6 (providing an overview of the literature on changing conceptions of immaturity); Allison James, Understanding Childhood from an Interdisciplinary Perspective: Problems and Potentials, in RETHINKING CHILDHOOD 25, 28 (Peter B. Pufall & Richard P. Unsworth eds., 2004)
(arguing that “[t]he socially constructed character of childhood” is demonstrated by
looking at “differing legal, social, and cultural expectations about children” across cultures); Prout & James, supra, at 7 (“The immaturity of children is a biological fact of
life but the ways in which this immaturity is understood and made meaningful is a fact
of culture.”); see also VIVIANA A. ZELIZER, PRICING THE PRICELESS CHILD: THE CHANGING SOCIAL VALUE OF CHILDREN (1985) (tracking the evolution of the concept of
childhood and the value of children between the 1870s and 1930s). Accordingly, although statements about children’s needs may often be masked as empirical claims,
they are almost always the product of social and cultural choices. See Martin Woodhead, Psychology and the Cultural Construction of Children’s Needs, in CONSTRUCTING AND
RECONSTRUCTING CHILDHOOD, supra, at 60, 60-66.
33
See, e.g., JAMES ET AL., supra note 28, at 38 (discussing the ways in which families
and schools play a primary role in the construction of childhood in the Western world,
serving as “regimes of discipline, learning, development, maturation and skill”).
PERIENCE
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them. But more saliently, home and school are defined against these
other spaces; home and school could not fulfill their respective socializing roles without the “free” spaces surrounding them. Indeed,
home and school acquire meaning for children primarily in contrast
to the spaces that are not home or school. Understanding what happens outside of home and school is therefore crucial to understanding
the socialization that happens within home and school.
Second, the social science literature delineates the manner in
which children between home and school are exposed to community
members who are neither their parents nor their teachers. The identity of these actors, and the degree of their influence, varies from
child to child in ways that may correlate to class, race, geography, religion, gender, or parental philosophy. For instance, children from
affluent families are more likely to be involved in organized activities
between home and school than children from less affluent families,
who tend to engage in more informal activities, often with other chil34
35
dren. This trend is consistent among black and white children, although black middle-class parents are often more conscious than
white middle-class parents about the racial composition of their children’s activities, purposely steering their children toward both all36
black and racially mixed activities. Similarly, religious parents often
encourage their children to participate in activities sponsored by reli37
gious institutions, in addition to sports or arts-related activities.
Whatever the activity, children encounter community members during these activities, and these community members frequently convey
information about community values and practices. This information
does not replace the messages that children receive at home or school
from their parents and teachers, but children do balance this informa38
tion against those other messages.

34

See LAREAU, supra note 28, at 35-36 (identifying various factors that lead to class
disparities in differing forms of childhood activities).
35
Id. at 240-41, 282.
36
For examples of scholars noting these trends, see id. at 120-24, 168-69; Patricia
Hill Collins, Shifting the Center: Race, Class, and Feminist Theorizing About Motherhood, in
MOTHERING: IDEOLOGY, EXPERIENCE, AND AGENCY 45, 54-55 (Evelyn Nakano Glenn et
al. eds., 1994).
37
For examples, see LAREAU, supra note 28, at 110-20, 185-86.
38
See, e.g., Stuart C. Aitken, Global Crises of Childhood: Rights, Justice and the Unchildlike Child, 33 AREA 119, 123 (2001) (discussing how messages from outside the home
are “received, internalized, resisted and mobilized” by children); Mary Gauvain, Sociocultural Contexts of Learning, in LEARNING IN CULTURAL CONTEXT: FAMILY, PEERS,
AND SCHOOL 11, 12-19 (Ashley E. Maynard & Mary I. Martini eds., 2005) (examining
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Moreover, the content of the information can be less important
than the actors conveying the information and the location in which
they do so. Because the information is not directly accompanied by
the authority of a parent or teacher, children may be more or less receptive to it. In addition, because the information is conveyed in locations that are not generally associated with parental discipline or education, children may not even realize that they are receiving
information, because they may be more focused on playing or taking a
break from the lessons of home and school. Ideas of appropriate
community behavior are often internalized in this way, particularly
ideas regarding acceptable gender and racial performances, as well as
information about other issues valued by the community and by vari39
ous subcommunities.
Finally, children can create their own identities in these spaces between home and school and, in doing so, can influence other children’s identities as well. By focusing on the respective roles of parents
and the state in childrearing, legal scholars often ignore the roles that
children play in both their own socialization and the socialization of
40
other children. The social science literature emphasizes that children are not just passive recipients of childrearing; rather, they also
play an active role in shaping their own worlds and the worlds of other
41
children. Indeed, children often may be more influenced by other
how “the child’s participation in cultural activity” influences learning and socialization).
39
See, e.g., Gagen, supra note 31, at 213 (describing how “[e]ducational establishments, loosely defined” are often “the spaces through which children become aware
of, and begin reproducing, social identities that circulate through broader social
space”); Fiona Smith & John Barker, “Out of School,” In School: A Social Geography of Out
of School Childcare, in CHILDREN’S GEOGRAPHIES, supra note 28, at 245, 247-54 (describing the role of British “out of school clubs” in shaping interactions between children
and children’s worldviews).
40
See Buss, supra note 3, at 30 (identifying the child herself as “another, often
overlooked, private competitor for developmental control” over children); cf. Rosalind
Edwards & Miriam David, Where Are the Children in Home-School Relations? Notes Towards
a Research Agenda, 11 CHILD. & SOC’Y 194, 195 (1997) (stating that the “prevalent
home-school orthodoxy” in the field of sociology “does not consider children, either as
individual or collective participants in the process” of education).
41
See, e.g., Prout & James, supra note 32, at 8 (“Children are and must be seen as
active in the construction and determination of their own social lives, the lives of those
around them and of the societies in which they live.”); Buss, supra note 3, at 34 (pointing out that a child necessarily exercises some control over her own development,
“whether she likes it or not,” because “[s]he reacts when parents, the state, or anyone
else, acts in an attempt to shape her development, and she reacts to the host of environmental and cultural forces that exist without regard to her development”); Emily
Buss, The Adolescent’s Stake in the Allocation of Educational Control Between Parent and State,
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children than by their parents, teachers, or other community mem42
bers. Of course, children’s opportunities to express themselves and,
in turn, to influence other children, are greater in some spaces than
others. At home and school, their freedom is generally limited by
strict schedules, school curricula, and discipline by parents or teachers. Children often enjoy more freedom between home and school,
but not always. For example, playgrounds, parks, and streets generally
provide more opportunity for self-expression and influence than is
43
typically found at home or school, whereas some religious or organized sports activities may provide less freedom. Regardless of the degree of freedom afforded to children in these spaces, however, children often express their identities differently than they would at
school or home. This is because these spaces play a less dominant
role in the structuring of childhood, and their boundaries are more
44
ambiguous.
In sum, the social science literature reveals that the spaces between home and school are vital to understanding how children are
constituted and socialized in our existing society. These spaces are
important as locations, because they provide the boundaries of children’s experiences of home and school. The contents of the spaces
are also important, because children are exposed to diverse actors
within the spaces, including other children, and children may perform their identities—and influence other children’s identities—
differently than they would at home or school. The spaces between

67 U. CHI. L. REV. 1233, 1233 (2000) [hereinafter Buss, The Adolescent’s Stake] (“What
matters to adolescent development is relationships with peers, because it is largely
through these relationships that they pursue the difficult and important task of identity formation—the sorting and selecting of values, beliefs, and tastes that will define
their adult selves.”).
42
See, e.g., JUDITH RICH HARRIS, THE NURTURE ASSUMPTION: WHY CHILDREN
TURN OUT THE WAY THEY DO 147-71 (1998) (describing the influences of peers on
children’s behavior); Buss, The Adolescent’s Stake, supra note 41, at 1270-76 (exploring
the role of peers in adolescence); cf. MCCLAIN, supra note 5, at 82 (“Public discourse
tends to ‘go to extremes’ about families, assuming either that family structure alone
wholly determines a child’s fate, or that parents have almost no impact on their children’s development, with peers exerting a far more important influence. The truth
surely lies somewhere in the middle.” (endnote omitted)).
43
See generally Hugh Matthews et al., The “Street as Thirdspace”, in CHILDREN’S GEOGRAPHIES, supra note 28, at 63.
44
See, e.g., Pia Christensen et al., Home and Movement: Children Constructing “Family
Time”, in CHILDREN’S GEOGRAPHIES, supra note 28, at 139, 143-48, 153-54 (describing
how children’s understandings of themselves and their families is achieved through
movement in, out, and around the home, and how movement in general is formative
of children’s social learning).
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home and school, therefore, can tell us a great deal about the “who,”
“what,” and “where” of the socialization of children in the United
States.
B. Legal Implications
In contrast to the social science literature, family law’s focus on
the respective roles of parents and the state in the rearing of children
ignores any childrearing that is not performed at home or school by
parents or the state. Socialization that occurs between home and
school is therefore rendered legally invisible. If such invisibility reflects the view of family law scholars that little meaningful socialization takes place between home and school, the social science literature greatly challenges that view.
Alternatively, family law’s neglect of childrearing between home
and school may reflect some scholars’ views about the proper scope of
legal regulation. As discussed more fully in Part II below, families
45
have long been afforded certain protections from such regulation.
Consistent with this respect for family privacy, once a parent-child relationship is established, it is generally seen as existing outside of the
law except in two instances. First, the state may intervene, in order to
protect the welfare of children, when parents fail to perform their
childrearing responsibilities or cannot resolve disputes with a coparent. Second, in order to ensure that children are properly prepared for the obligations of citizenship, the state may require families
to educate their children. Childrearing between home and school
falls within neither of these traditional exceptions to family privacy.
Therefore, even if meaningful socialization takes place between home
and school, this childrearing could be viewed as properly subsumed
46
under family privacy, outside of the law’s reach.
This normative view of childrearing between home and school
does not require family law to remain silent about such childrearing,
however. The scope of family privacy—and its very existence—is hotly
47
contested within the law. Many scholars have long argued that fam45

See infra text accompanying notes 112-126.
Cf. Woodhouse, supra note 4, at 86 (describing how the “traditional paradigm”
in family law aligns organizations “from soccer clubs to churches to boot camps for defiant teens” with private parental power).
47
See, e.g., SUSAN MOLLER OKIN, JUSTICE, GENDER, AND THE FAMILY 128-33 (1989)
(discussing four flaws with the public/private dichotomy); Frances E. Olsen, The Family
and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1497, 1567-69
(1983) (asserting that “[p]olarizing the family and the market does not increase the
46
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ily privacy should be tempered because it harms individuals with rela48
tively little private power, particularly women and children, and
masks the various ways that the public and private realms are interde49
pendent. The very debate emphasizes that family privacy is a legal
construct, a product of policy choices rather than a reflection of a preexisting reality. The spaces between home and school thus need not
be subsumed by an extension of family privacy. Moreover, as discussed more fully in Part III below, courts have viewed such spaces as
50
worthy of regulation in several contexts.
In addition, even those who advocate expansive notions of family
privacy could find it useful to examine the ways in which childhood is
shaped and constructed by family law’s nearly exclusive focus on the
socializing power of parents and the state, at home and at school respectively. The social science literature is notably silent about the
law’s role in the construction of childhood. Many judges and legal
scholars also have not explicitly viewed childhood as a social construc51
tion, instead viewing childhood—and the corresponding rights and
disabilities that attach to it—primarily as a function of biological age.
Nonetheless, laws in the United States have long reflected an understanding of childhood as a social construction, for they specify the different ages at which children become legal adults for purposes of
marriage, sexual activity, employment, driving, drinking, voting, and
criminal prosecution. Moreover, lawmakers have, at times, changed
52
those ages for reasons other than new understandings of maturity.

possibilities available to individuals and the human personality,” and arguing that society should “transcend” the “market/family dichotomy”).
48
See, e.g., Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Violence of Privacy, 23 CONN. L. REV. 973,
974-79 (1991) (describing “the ways in which concepts of privacy permit, encourage,
and reinforce violence against women”); Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, “Who Owns the
Child?”: Meyer and Pierce and the Child as Property, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 995, 1037–
68 (1992) (providing a historical analysis of power in family relationships).
49
See, e.g., Anne C. Dailey, Constitutional Privacy and the Just Family, 67 TUL. L. REV.
955, 1028 (1993) (“[T]he domestic sphere neither is nor should be a sphere free from
governmental regulation; rather, the state properly defines many central aspects of
family life.”); Martha Albertson Fineman, What Place for Family Privacy?, 67 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 1207, 1208 (1999) (“The metaphor of ‘symbiosis’ seems more appropriate than
the separate spheres imagery: the family is located within the state. . . . [F]amily and
state are interactive; they define one another.” (footnote omitted)).
50
See infra text accompanying notes 176-192.
51
One notable exception is Barbara Bennett Woodhouse. See Woodhouse, supra
note 4, at 113 (“Modern scholars recognize that childhood is a culturally constructed
idea, rather than a universal fact.”).
52
See HARRIS & TEITELBAUM, supra note 13, at 494 (“The age of majority is arbitrary not in the sense that it is unreasonable but in that it is variable from time to time
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Similarly, courts have determined that children enjoy adult-like rights
of privacy and association for some purposes, but for other purposes,
children must wait until adulthood before they may exercise full
53
autonomy. The legal meaning of childhood is thus fluid and shifting, and that legal construction affects children’s experiences of
childhood.
On a less explicit level, children’s experiences of childhood are
also affected by the law’s focus on childrearing only at home or at
school. The rights of parents to control childrearing in the home
pursuant to notions of family privacy, and the right of the state to control—or at least regulate—childrearing that takes place at school,
means that these spaces of home and school are salient to children,
parents, and the rest of society. Other spaces, in contrast, can be seen
as insignificant because they are not worthy of the law’s protection or
intervention, even if they are significant sites of learning and identity
formation, as the social science literature illustrates. The law’s focus
on the appropriate allocation of childrearing authority between parents and the state can also create a perception of the child as an ob54
ject to be possessed, which, in turn, can affect children’s perceptions
of their own autonomy and of who should be significant in their lives.
The law confines its analysis to whether children should belong to
parents or to the state, instead of adopting a broader approach that
considers how children are socialized by various actors in diverse
spaces.
Childhood is thus shaped in part by the current scope of family
law doctrine—both its substance and its omissions. These omissions,
by their very nature, make certain childhood experiences invisible
within family law discourse. Because family law itself is also a con-

and is often established to reflect some, but not all, levels of maturity and capacity.”);
cf. Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131, 1164 n.152
(1991) (“[T]he Twenty-Sixth Amendment extending the franchise to eighteen-yearolds grew out of the perceived unfairness of any gap between the Vietnam draft age
and the voting age.”).
53
See, e.g., David D. Meyer, The Modest Promise of Children’s Relationship Rights, 11
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1117, 1117-20 (2003) (describing various ways in which “children occupy decidedly shadowy ground in the constitutional law protecting family privacy”).
54
See Woodhouse, supra note 48, at 1114 (describing how the traditional focus on
parents’ rights to direct the upbringing of their children produces a conception of
children as the “conduit for the parents’ religious expression, cultural identity, and
class aspirations”).
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55

struction, these experiences need not remain invisible. Over the
past few years, two legal scholars have begun to examine this disconnect between law and reality in one particular context: the effect of
the media and advertising industries on children’s socialization. Both
Barbara Bennett Woodhouse and Kenneth Karst have illustrated how
these industries supplement, and often supplant, parental and state
56
authority over children. For Karst, “the media are performing much
of the homogenizing, standardizing function once claimed for the
57
common school,” and they “compete . . . powerfully with parents’
58
and schools’ voices on sex and sexuality.” For Woodhouse, “[m]edia
and marketing, far more than family or government, create and manipulate child and youth culture and are reshaping the ecology of
59
childhood and youth.” In her view, “mass-media marketing” is “a potentially destructive assault on children’s environment that we must
60
strive to understand and attempt to regulate.” According to both
Woodhouse and Karst, then, this type of activity between home and
school presents a threat to family law’s traditional approach to childrearing and, at least for Woodhouse, a threat to childhood itself. In
response, Woodhouse calls for a new legal paradigm, grounded in developmental psychology, in which parents become partners with the
state and encourage the “government’s role in preserving an ecologi61
cal environment that supports children’s healthy development.”
Karst, in contrast, is much less optimistic about the prospects of regulation designed to bolster the socializing power of parents or the
62
state.
55

See Jill Elaine Hasday, The Canon of Family Law, 57 STAN. L. REV. 825, 829 (2004)
(“[L]egislatures, courts, and legal scholars have created the family law canon, and the
family law canon has in turn shaped how these legal authorities and scholars think
about family law, and how they teach their students and successors to view the field.”).
56
Karst, supra note 4, at 1002-11; Woodhouse, supra note 4, at 104-11. Given the
nuanced analyses of these industries by Professors Woodhouse and Karst, this Article
will not focus on commercial spaces between home and school, but instead will focus
on other spaces that have been ignored within family law scholarship. For additional
commentary on how children’s actions are influenced by advertisers, see Stephen D.
Sugarman, Framing Public Interventions with Respect to Children as Parent-Empowering 12-13,
(U.C. Berkeley Pub. Law Research Paper No. 925246, 2006), available at http://
ssrn.com/abstract=925246.
57
Karst, supra note 4, at 1003.
58
Id. at 1007.
59
Woodhouse, supra note 4, at 92.
60
Id. at 94-95.
61
Id. at 165.
62
See Karst, supra note 4, at 1004, 1028 (arguing that the power of law as a socializing force “is often an illusion”).
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This recent work of Karst and Woodhouse is significant, in that it
acknowledges important socializing forces family law previously has
neglected, in large part because they are not attributable to either parents or the state, at home or at school. Nonetheless, the media and
advertising industries are not the only socializing forces between
home and school, nor are all such forces necessarily harmful to children. Therefore, an acknowledgment of childrearing between home
and school need not always inspire calls for increased state regulation
or sighs of helplessness. Instead, an acknowledgment of all the types
of childrearing between home and school can illustrate the diversity
of this childrearing and highlight how, although ignored within family
law, such childrearing has not always operated outside of the law’s
reach.
C. Introducing the Boy Scouts
The Supreme Court’s 2000 decision in Boy Scouts of America v.
63
Dale, discussed in more detail in Part II below, repeatedly addressed
the desires of the Boy Scouts to “instill[] its system of values in young
64
people.” The case is unique in that it concerned the teaching of
children, specifically boys, in a context unconnected to parents or the
state, at locations other than home or school. Thus, it does not fit
within family law’s triangle paradigm, but it undoubtedly concerns
childrearing. Even so, the case has been viewed solely as a dispute between adults, having no relation to family law. In fact, family law
scholars have barely commented on Dale at all. By leaving Dale to
other legal scholars, family law scholars once again signal that childrearing performed between home and school, by neither parents nor
the state, is insignificant or unworthy of legal attention. An examination of the Court’s opinion reveals, however, that this is far from the
case.
The Supreme Court ruled in Dale that the Boy Scouts could legitimately prevent James Dale, a gay man, from leading a troop of Boy
Scouts in New Jersey, even though the Boy Scouts is considered a
65
place of public accommodation under New Jersey law, and New Jer-

63

530 U.S. 640 (2000).
Id. at 644.
65
Id. at 656-57 (noting that “New Jersey’s statutory definition of ‘[a] place of public accommodation’ is extremely broad,” and has been applied not only to “clearly
commercial” private entities, but also to “membership organizations such as the Boy
Scouts”).
64
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66

sey’s public accommodations law explicitly prohibits discrimination
67
on the basis of sexual orientation. The New Jersey Supreme Court
had ruled in Dale’s favor, rejecting the Boy Scouts’s argument that it
should be exempt from New Jersey’s public accommodations law because application of the law would violate the organization’s First
68
Amendment right of expressive association. The United States Su69
preme Court reversed, however, in a five-to-four decision.
The
Court reached its holding on First Amendment expressive association
grounds, concluding that Dale’s mere presence would infringe the
Boy Scouts’s First Amendment right to express its desired message re70
garding sexuality. Although the Supreme Court’s analysis focused
on the speaker of that message—the national Boy Scouts organization—a closer look at the case reveals that the message would not have
mattered but for its recipients: the boys of the Boy Scouts. Dale is thus
a case about childrearing—more specifically, the socialization of
boys—and who may make decisions about childrearing in one particular space between home and school.
Granted, the Supreme Court did not affix the label of childrearing to the activities at issue in Dale, nor did it mention the family at all.
In fact, the Court barely even mentioned boys, the constitutive members of the Boy Scouts. Instead, the issue was framed as one pitting
the rights of the group, the Boy Scouts, against the rights of James
Dale. But Dale was asserting his right to lead and teach a group of
boys. Dale thus sought recognition of a right to participate in the Boy
Scouts’s childrearing activities in his New Jersey community.
Commentators have found the Supreme Court’s decision in Dale
puzzling as a matter of First Amendment expressive association doctrine. The opinion seems at odds with the Court’s prior expressive as-

66

N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-4 (West 2002).
530 U.S. at 659. Dale had grown up as a Boy Scout and began serving as an assistant scoutmaster in college. While at college, he also came out as gay and served as
co-president of the school’s lesbian/gay alliance. When Dale’s involvement in the
group was mentioned in a newspaper article, the Boy Scouts removed Dale from his
position as an assistant scoutmaster. When Dale asked why, a local Boy Scouts executive wrote that the Boy Scouts “‘specifically forbid[s] membership to homosexuals.’”
Id. at 644-45.
68
Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 734 A.2d 1196, 1228 (N.J. 1999).
69
Chief Justice Rehnquist authored the majority opinion and was joined by Justices O’Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas. Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and
Breyer dissented.
70
530 U.S. at 653-59.
67

852

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 155: 833

71

sociation cases, primarily Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, Board of Directors of Ro72
tary International v. Rotary Club of Duarte, and New York State Club Ass’n
73
v. City of New York, all of which applied state public accommodations
laws to force groups to admit women as members. Because the facts
in those cases were similar to those in Dale, yet the Dale outcome so
different, commentators have been left with doubts about the continued validity of past expressive association doctrine, and with questions
about the substance and scope of any “new” expressive association
74
doctrine which may have silently guided the Court’s analysis.

71

468 U.S. 609 (1984).
481 U.S. 537 (1987).
73
487 U.S. 1 (1988).
74
See Erwin Chemerinsky & Catherine Fisk, The Expressive Interest of Associations, 9
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 595, 601 (2001) (arguing that the Court effectively undermined its decision in Jaycees by allowing the Boy Scouts to define its expressive message
during litigation, irrespective of evidentiary support and without judicial scrutiny);
Daniel A. Farber, Speaking in the First Person Plural: Expressive Associations and the First
Amendment, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1483, 1491-97 (2001) (tracing the move from the “old” to
the “new” expressive association doctrine established in Dale); Nan D. Hunter, Accommodating the Public Sphere: Beyond the Market Model, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1591, 1603 (2001)
(noting in Dale “a distressing willingness to abdicate the role of assessing the bona
fides of an organization’s claim about the degree of harm that would be inflicted by an
individual’s presence”); Andrew Koppelman, Signs of the Times: Dale v. Boy Scouts of
America and the Changing Meaning of Nondiscrimination, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 1819,
1821-26 (2002) (discussing the “remarkable degree of deference” afforded the Boy
Scouts in Dale and the extent of the Court’s departure in that case from previous doctrine); Jed Rubenfeld, The First Amendment’s Purpose, 53 STAN. L. REV. 767, 816-17
(2001) (arguing that Dale abandoned the established doctrine that “conduct law[s] of
general applicability” do not trigger First Amendment scrutiny even where there is an
expressive purpose to violate them).
Even commentators who support the outcome in Dale have questioned the Court’s
application of the existing expressive association doctrine to reach that outcome. See,
e.g., David E. Bernstein, Antidiscrimination Laws and the First Amendment, 66 MO. L. REV.
83, 124 (2001) (“Dale would be a much less confusing opinion if the majority had bitten the bullet and explicitly overruled Roberts.”); Richard A. Epstein, The Constitutional
Perils of Moderation: The Case of the Boy Scouts, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 119, 120-22 (2000) (arguing that Dale was too narrowly decided and that all private associations that are not
in a monopoly position should be exempt from antidiscrimination laws); The Supreme
Court—1999 Term: Leading Cases, 114 HARV. L. REV. 179, 262 (2000) (“The Court could
have found a more practically sound basis for its holding by considering whether the
government may commandeer BSA’s expressive facilities as passive conduits for an
ideological message the organization finds objectionable.”); see also Laurence H. Tribe,
Disentangling Symmetries: Speech, Association, Parenthood, 28 PEPP. L. REV. 641, 656 (2001)
(“Looked at strictly as a First Amendment case, Boy Scouts may be something of a
stretch, or at least an anomaly.” (footnote omitted)). Other commentators, however,
have used the decision in Dale to examine problematic aspects of the Supreme Court’s
past expressive association cases. See, e.g., Seana Valentine Shiffrin, What Is Really Wrong
with Compelled Association?, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 839, 880 (2005) (“[T]he Jaycees approach
72

2007]

BETWEEN HOME AND SCHOOL

853

The outcome in Dale seems less puzzling, however, when one considers the membership of the Boy Scouts. Dale did not concern a social or business club consisting solely of adult members; rather, Dale
concerned an organization made up of boys and those adults, primarily men, who want to teach, lead, and mentor boys. The Boy Scouts
sought to exclude Dale based on the organization’s view that Dale’s
mere presence as a gay man would contradict the messages that the
Boy Scouts was attempting to impart to boys regarding issues of sexuality. At bottom, Dale is about boys and who may guide them on the
road to becoming men.
The majority and dissenting opinions in Dale emphasized this
childrearing mission, but then relied on traditional expressive associa75
tion doctrine to reach their respective outcomes. The majority began its focus on childrearing by finding that
the general mission of the Boy Scouts is clear: “[T]o instill values in
young people.” The Boy Scouts seeks to instill these values by having its
adult leaders spend time with the youth members, instructing and engaging them in activities like camping, archery, and fishing. During the
time spent with the youth members, the scoutmasters and assistant
scoutmasters inculcate them with the Boy Scouts’ values—both expressly
76
and by example.

Based on this factual finding, the majority then concluded that
77
the Boy Scouts engages in expressive activity, and that Dale’s pres78
ence would “surely interfere” with that expression, because the Boy
Scouts seeks to instill the values of heterosexuality, as opposed to homosexuality, and the First Amendment protects the Boy Scouts’s
79
teaching-by-example method of expression.
Given these conclusions, the majority held that application of New Jersey’s public ac-

to the value of association is wrongly message-based and excessively outwardly focused.”).
75
Shiffrin, supra note 74, at 881 (“By and large, it was taken for granted by all the
Justices in Dale that the standard test for freedom of association claims applied.”).
76
Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 649-50 (2000) (citation omitted) (quoting the Boy Scouts of America mission statement).
77
See id. at 650 (“It seems indisputable that an association that seeks to transmit
such a system of values engages in expressive activity.”).
78
Id. at 654.
79
See id. at 655-56 (“The presence of an avowed homosexual and gay rights activist
in an assistant scoutmaster’s uniform sends a distinctly different message from the
presence of a heterosexual assistant scoutmaster who is on record as disagreeing with
Boy Scouts policy.”).
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commodations law in this case would significantly impair the Boy
80
Scouts’s ability to impart its desired values to boys.
The two dissenting opinions, by Justices Stevens and Souter, primarily challenged the majority’s deference to the Boy Scouts’s own
81
formulation of the values it seeks to impart to boys, and the majority’s conclusion that Dale’s mere presence would convey a message
about homosexuality. Justice Stevens, in particular, emphasized that
there is “no basis . . . to presume that a homosexual will be unable to
82
comply with [the Boy Scouts’s] policy not to discuss sexual matters,”
and he concluded that “[t]he only apparent explanation for the majority’s holding, then, is that homosexuals are simply so different from
the rest of society that their presence alone—unlike any other individual’s—should be singled out for special First Amendment treat83
ment.”
The majority’s holding has some appeal under principles of expressive association; after all, views on sexuality are indeed a message.
This appeal dissipates, however, when one examines why the Boy
Scouts excluded Dale. It was not because of anything Dale said as a
80

Id. at 656. The Court distinguished Jaycees and Rotary Club on the ground that
requiring those groups to accept female members did not “materially interfere with
the ideas [those groups] sought to express,” id. at 657, although those groups had also
claimed that the inclusion of women would impair the messages they sought to convey.
Id. at 657-58. For example, the Rotary Club claimed that admitting women would destroy an “‘aspect of fellowship . . . that is enjoyed by the male membership’” and hinder
its ability “to operate effectively in foreign countries with varied cultures and social
mores.” Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int’l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 541 (1987)
(quoting and citing testimony of Rotary International’s General Secretary). The Rotary
Club and Jaycees Courts rejected such arguments, concluding that the relevant inquiry
was whether admitting the undesired applicants would “impose[] any serious burdens”
on the group’s “collective effort on behalf of [its] shared goals.” Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 622, 626 (1984); Rotary Club, 481 U.S. at 548. As Justice Brennan
stated in Jaycees, admitting women did not require a “change in the Jaycees’ creed of
promoting the interests of young men,” nor did it otherwise impede the organization’s
“protected activities.” 468 U.S. at 627.
81
530 U.S. at 665-78, 684-96 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens analyzed the
Boy Scouts’s published guidance and policy statements, concluding that teaching
about sexuality, and particularly teaching about the undesirability of homosexuality,
was not “part of the group’s collective efforts to foster a belief.” Id. at 677. Accordingly, in Justice Stevens’s view, the Boy Scouts could not point to a sincere policy
against homosexuality, nor could it connect that policy to the group’s expressive activities. Id. at 677-78. Justice Souter more simply stated that his conclusion was based on
the Boy Scouts’s “failure to make sexual orientation the subject of any unequivocal advocacy, using the channels it customarily employs to state its message.” Id. at 701
(Souter, J., dissenting).
82
Id. at 691 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
83
Id. at 696.
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Boy Scout or because of anything he said to his troop. Nor was it because of anything he did as a Boy Scout or in front of his troop. Indeed, there was no evidence indicating that Dale’s troop members, or
84
their parents, even knew that he was gay. Additionally, Dale testified
that he had no intention of informing his troop of his sexuality or
85
otherwise discussing sexuality.
Despite these facts, the Boy Scouts asserted that it could exclude
Dale because it found that his mere presence—not any speech or
conduct—conflicted with the Boy Scouts’s desired message and its
teach-by-example philosophy. The majority of the Court accepted this
explanation, holding that Dale’s silent presence infringed the Boy
Scouts’s speech. The Court’s holding thus diverges from other First
Amendment cases, where a particular individual’s speech conflicted
86
with the group’s message.
Given the Court’s emphasis on the Boy Scouts’s childrearing role,
however, it is not surprising that Dale differs from other First Amendment cases. Some commentators have concluded that homophobia
87
explains the Dale majority’s unique approach. But Dale did not con84

See id. at 697 (“[I]n this case there is no evidence that the young Scouts in Dale’s
troop, or members of their families, were even aware of his sexual orientation.”).
85
As Justice Stevens’s dissent stressed: “Dale did not carry a banner or a sign; he
did not distribute any factsheet; and he expressed no intent to send any message.” Id.
at 694-95; see also Tribe, supra note 74, at 650 (“[T]he inclusion of openly gay scout
leaders cannot be assumed to result in infiltrating the Scouts with individuals interested in undermining the group from within, radically changing the Scouts’ Oath, or
modifying the Scouts’ other defining documents.”).
86
For example, Dale is distinguishable from Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian
and Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc., 515 U.S. 557 (1995), because Dale, unlike the parade
participants carrying banners in Hurley, was not identifying himself as gay or otherwise
communicating about his sexuality.
87
See, e.g., Chemerinsky & Fisk, supra note 74, at 613 (“The conservative majority . . .
reinforces the sense that Dale is really about how these five Justices feel about homosexuality.”); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Pluralism and Distrust: How Courts Can Support Democracy
by Lowering the Stakes of Politics, 114 YALE L.J. 1279, 1291-92 (2005) (discussing the influence of “antigay prejudice” on judicial decision making); Hunter, supra note 74, at 1608
(“[T]he Court impliedly finds that almost any openly gay or lesbian person is radioactive.”); Arthur S. Leonard, Boy Scouts of America v. Dale: The “Gay Rights Activist” as Constitutional Pariah, 12 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 27, 32 (2001) (stating that Dale may be “yet
another example of the ‘gay exception’ to the U.S. Constitution”). But see William N.
Eskridge, Jr., Lawrence’s Jurisprudence of Tolerance: Judicial Review To Lower the Stakes of
Identity Politics, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1021, 1074 n.197 (2004) [hereinafter Eskridge, Lawrence’s Jurisprudence of Tolerance] (“Once Lawrence and Romer replace Hardwick as the relevant background, however, Hurley and (even) Dale can be read as signals that the Court
will protect both gay people and traditionalists where the Constitution requires.”); Michael Stokes Paulsen, Scouts, Families, and Schools, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1917, 1937-38 (2001)
(arguing that Justice Stevens’s dissent in Dale was motivated by religious bigotry).
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cern homosexuality in the abstract or in business-oriented social
groups such as the Jaycees. Rather, the Court considered whether a
group that instills values in boys could exclude homosexual men as
mentors and leaders because the group considers homosexuality to be
88
incompatible with masculinity and “the good life.”
As such, the
Court confronted not just homosexuality, but the prospect of gay men
equipping boys with the tools of manhood.
Dale is thus about a very particular type of speech, childrearing by
89
example, which is difficult to distinguish from childrearing itself.
The Court had to consider, in essence, who may teach children by example free from state intrusion. Given this context, the outcome of
Dale implicitly may be more about childrearing—and the deference
traditionally accorded to certain types of childrearing—than about
speech in general. Part II of this Article examines Dale from this family law perspective.
II. A FAMILY LAW READING OF BOY SCOUTS OF AMERICA V. DALE
Childrearing, like other family functions, has long been protected
by notions of family privacy and autonomy. This protection has its
origins in the nineteenth-century belief that life was properly divided
88

See Marc R. Poirier, Hastening the Kulturkampf: Boy Scouts of America v. Dale
and the Politics of American Masculinity, 12 LAW & SEXUALITY 271, 318 (2003) (observing
that the Boy Scouts attempt to “construct[] masculinity by excluding sissies and thus
openly gay men”); cf. Stephen Clark, Judicially Straight? Boy Scouts v. Dale and the Missing Scalia Dissent, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 521, 589 (2003) (stating that James Dale was not
“the kind of dsytopian exemplar of gender-rigidified heterosexual mating that the Boy
Scouts desired in its role models”). The Boy Scouts is not alone in its view of homosexuality as incompatible with masculinity. For example, the Ninth Circuit has confronted, and rejected, assertions of that view in several employment discrimination
cases. See, e.g., Rene v. MGM Grand Hotel, Inc., 305 F.3d 1061, 1068 (9th Cir. 2002)
(en banc) (Pregerson, J., concurring) (concluding that co-workers’ treatment of the
plaintiff, a homosexual man, constituted “actionable gender stereotyping harassment”
because the co-workers treated the plaintiff “like a woman”); Nichols v. Azteca Rest.
Enters., Inc., 256 F.3d 864, 874-75 (9th Cir. 2001) (agreeing that “a man who is discriminated against for acting too feminine” has a valid claim under Title VII).
89
In this way, Dale can be seen as similar to those custody cases that examine
whether children need role models of the same sex in order to internalize “proper” or
“healthy” gender and sexual performances. See, e.g., In re F.W., 870 A.2d 82, 87 (D.C.
2005) (“The fact that petitioners are a same-sex female couple cannot, in itself, be presumed contrary to [a male child’s] best interests.”); Levin v. Levin, 836 P.2d 529, 53233 (Idaho 1992) (addressing a mother’s argument that having a same-sex role model
was in her daughter’s best interests); Sandlin v. Sandlin, 906 So. 2d 39, 41-42 (Miss. Ct.
App. 2004) (affirming the decision to place a son in the custody of his father and a
daughter in the custody of her mother because of the respective needs of “a strong father figure” and a “mother’s guidance and advice”).
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90

between the public and private spheres. Pursuant to this ideology,
childrearing came to be seen as a private activity, to be performed in
91
the privacy of the home. The state intervened in childrearing only
to the extent necessary to protect children’s welfare in situations
92
where the state thought parents were defaulting on their duties, or
to educate future citizens by requiring school attendance and setting
93
policies for public and, to a lesser extent, private schools. This allocation of authority has remained to the present day, and family law
scholarship about the parent-child relationship takes it as a given, focusing almost exclusively on when the state should be able to trump
parental prerogatives, and when parents should be able to influence
state educational policies.
This legal treatment of the childrearing function ignores the fact
that childrearing has never been performed exclusively at home and
school, but also occurs in other spaces, such as Boy Scouts meetings.
As discussed in more detail below, however, the holding in Dale can be

90

See, e.g., NANCY F. COTT, THE BONDS OF WOMANHOOD: “WOMAN’S SPHERE” IN
NEW ENGLAND, 1780-1835, at 57 (1977) (“In an intriguing development in language
usage in the early nineteenth century, ‘home’ became synonymous with ‘retirement’
or ‘retreat’ from the world at large.”); MICHAEL GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE HEARTH:
LAW AND THE FAMILY IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 17 (1985) (discussing how the
nineteenth-century ideology of family governance glorified the separation of the republican family and the state); Olsen, supra note 47, at 1498-1500 (describing how the
nineteenth-century family was viewed as a refuge from the market); Reva B. Siegel,
“The Rule of Love”: Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy, 105 YALE L.J. 2117, 2147
(1996) (“Countless nineteenth-century accounts of the home depict the family as fundamentally distinct from other spheres of social life . . . .”). Prior to the industrial era,
the concepts of family, state, and market were more fluid and overlapping. For discussions of this interrelationship, see, for example, COTT, supra, at 59–62; Hila Keren, Can
Separate Be Equal? Intimate Economic Exchange and the Cost of Being Special, 119 HARV. L.
REV. F. 19, 20-23 (2006).
91
Prior to the nineteenth century, children often lived outside of their parents’
homes. See, e.g., EDMUND S. MORGAN, THE PURITAN FAMILY: ESSAYS ON RELIGION &
DOMESTIC LIFE IN SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY NEW ENGLAND 28-29, 36-38 (1944) (describing how many children lived in apprenticeships and other nonfamily situations during
the seventeenth century). For discussions of how childhood came to be experienced
primarily within the family home, see STEVEN MINTZ & SUSAN KELLOGG, DOMESTIC
REVOLUTIONS: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF AMERICAN FAMILY LIFE 58-60 (1988) (describing
how “a new conception of childhood began to emerge” in 1830, pursuant to which “a
growing number of parents, particularly in the Northeastern middle class, began to
keep their sons and daughters home well into their teens and even their twenties”);
WITOLD RYBCZYNSKI, HOME: A SHORT HISTORY OF AN IDEA 48-49, 77 (1986) (describing how, during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, children of the bourgeois
began living at home during their school years).
92
See infra notes 115-119 and accompanying text.
93
See infra notes 131-137 and accompanying text.
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read as quite consistent with family law doctrine that generally protects parents’ prerogatives to rear their children free from state intrusion, and, in particular, protects parents’ right to exclude whomever
94
they wish from the family home. Dale thus suggests that notions of
family privacy could attach to childrearing even when it is performed
outside of the home by organizations that do not look like the traditional parent, but that function as parental surrogates. The space between home and school is thereby enveloped by an extension of the
privacy of the home, leaving school as the sole domain where the
state’s interests in childrearing may trump private childrearing decisions.
Alternatively, however, the space between home and school could
be viewed as an extension of school, confining parental prerogatives to
the privacy of the home. From this perspective, parents still have a
right, at home, to impart to their children whatever values they
choose. Once outside the home, however, the state has more power.
The state may compel school attendance and control public school
95
curricula and policy.
Parents, consistent with their constitutional
and common law rights to direct the upbringing of their children,
may choose to send their children to private (as opposed to public)
96
97
schools, or even choose to home school. These choices, however,
are costly—in time, or money, or both. Moreover, even if parents are
willing and able to bear the costs, parental choice does not insulate
private schools and home schools from state regulation. Most pertinently, private schools are subject to state antidiscrimination laws: the
state interest in preventing discrimination trumps any right that parents may have to use private schools to impart the virtues of discrimi-

94

Many commentators have explored parents’ seemingly exclusive right to make
childrearing decisions. See, e.g., Buss, supra note 3, at 29 (discussing the traditional “exclusion of other private parties competing with parents for some or all control over a
child’s upbringing”). The state may sometimes mandate third-party visitation that is in
the child’s best interest, but such visitation does not entail entry into the home, and
the Supreme Court has held that states must give considerable deference to parents’
judgment before ordering such visitation, even when it occurs outside of the home.
See David D. Meyer, Lochner Redeemed: Family Privacy After Troxel and Carhart, 48
UCLA L. REV. 1125, 1163-69 (2001) (discussing Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000),
and examining the Court’s consideration of parental autonomy interests in the context
of child visitation).
95
See infra notes 132-134 and accompanying text (discussing cases illustrating the
state’s broad authority to make education-related decisions).
96
Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925).
97
See DAVIS ET AL., supra note 15, at 34 (noting that all states permit parents to
home school their children, so long as they meet state requirements).
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98

nation to their children. Analogizing the Boy Scouts to schools thus
provides support for an alternative holding in Dale. The Sections below explore these two possibilities.
A. Extending Home: The Boy Scouts as Parental Surrogate
Traditionally, courts have considered the rearing of boys, as well as
girls, in the context of determining the boundaries of parents’ authority
to direct the upbringing of their children. Obviously, the Boy Scouts is
not a parent. Nonetheless, throughout the majority opinion in Dale,
the Supreme Court focused on the rights of the Boy Scouts as an entity
under the First Amendment, not on the rights of the Boy Scouts’s
99
members. This approach represented a shift from the Court’s prior
approach in Jaycees, which primarily considered whether requiring the
Jaycees to admit women, pursuant to Minnesota’s public accommoda100
tions law, would affect the expression of the group’s members.
The Dale majority did not provide any explanation for this shift.
That may have been because it was obvious that the Boy Scouts’s
members, as minors, cannot make associational decisions on their
own, but instead may associate only at the direction of their parents or
other legal guardians. This reality did not require the Dale Court to
analyze the rights of the Boy Scouts as an entity, however. Instead, the
Court could have analyzed the associational rights of the parents who
98

See infra text accompanying notes 138-143 (discussing Runyon v. McCrary, 427
U.S. 160 (1976)—which held that private schools are not exempt from 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981 and therefore must admit African-American students—and emphasizing the
fact that private schools are subject to Title VII).
99
See Chemerinsky & Fisk, supra note 74, at 609 (“Simply put, the Court’s failing in
Dale was its determining the expressive message of the group without any consideration of the views or rights of the members.”); Farber, supra note 74, at 1494-96
(“[E]arlier cases often focused on the participation of members in the association.
The focus in recent cases such as Dale, however, is on the rights of the organization as
an entity, not on the rights of its individual members.”). In dissent, Justice Stevens
briefly considered the views of the members of the Boy Scouts, whether they be boys or
their parents, when he emphasized that neither the scouts in Dale’s troop nor their
families were aware of Dale’s sexual orientation. Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S.
640, 697 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting). During the rest of his dissent, however, Justice Stevens, like the majority, focused on the national leadership of the Boy Scouts,
thereby emphasizing the views of the entity as opposed to the views of the entity’s
members.
100
Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618 (1984); see also id. at 623 (“We are
persuaded that Minnesota’s compelling interest in eradicating discrimination against
its female citizens justifies the impact that application of the statute to the Jaycees may
have on the male members’ associational freedoms.” (emphasis added)). For criticism of
this focus on members, see Shiffrin, supra note 74, at 864-69.
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101

permit their sons to join the Boy Scouts.
That analysis, consistent
with Jaycees, would have considered the messages that the parents
sought to convey by permitting, and even encouraging, their sons to
102
join the Boy Scouts. The case’s outcome may not have changed, but
the approach would have been consistent with existing expressive association doctrine.
That the Dale Court chose not to analyze the associational rights of
the parents of the Boy Scouts could indicate that the Court saw the
Boy Scouts as a particular type of entity: an entity functioning as a parental surrogate. Parents entrust their sons to the Boy Scouts, delegating a portion of their childrearing authority to the organization. The
Boy Scouts may thus be more than an entity comprised of parents as
members, each with their own views. Instead, the Boy Scouts could be
seen as an entity that has partially assumed the authority of its mem103
bers to rear their children, in effect becoming a parental surrogate.
Just as a parent is (or attempts to be) the final arbiter of the lessons
her children heed, the Boy Scouts is the final arbiter of the lessons to
which boys are exposed during their time with the Boy Scouts organization. Once parents choose to delegate a portion of their childrearing authority to the organization and permit their sons to remain affiliated with the organization, their own personal views become
subordinate—or even irrelevant.
The Dale Court’s deference to the Boy Scouts’s message and teachby-example approach supports this view of the Boy Scouts as a parental surrogate. When childrearing takes place within the home, parents generally have discretion to impart to their children whatever
104
values they please and to exclude anyone they choose.
As discussed
105
in more detail below, this protection of parents’ childrearing au101

Cf. Shiffrin, supra note 74, at 883 (asking “whether the proper characterization
of the Boy Scouts is as an association of children or as a mixed association of adults
and children”).
102
It is unknown whether the parents in New Jersey supported the Boy Scouts’s
view about the suitability of gay troop leaders. As discussed above, the parents of the
boys in James Dale’s troop did not know that Dale was gay. See supra text accompanying notes 84-85.
103
For a discussion of other potential parental surrogates, see Janet L. Dolgin, The
Constitution as Family Arbiter: A Moral in the Mess?, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 337, 395-404
(2002) (including grandparents and “de facto” parents as parental surrogates); cf. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 606-08 (1979) (holding that parents have the right to commit
a child to a state mental institution against the child’s wishes, so long as a “neutral factfinder,” such as a doctor, agrees).
104
See supra text accompanying notes 90-94.
105
See infra notes 112-126 and accompanying text.
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thority has both constitutional and common law origins. In the New
Jersey courts, the Boy Scouts directly appealed to one strand of this
protection of parental authority, arguing that the Boy Scouts’s national organization, like families, could exclude Dale pursuant to the
First Amendment right of intimate association. The New Jersey Supreme Court ultimately rejected the intimate association argument,
holding that the Boy Scouts’s “large size, nonselectivity, inclusive
rather than exclusive purpose, and practice of inviting or allowing
nonmembers to attend meetings, establish that the organization is not
‘sufficiently personal or private to warrant constitutional protection’
106
under the freedom of intimate association.”
The Dale majority did
107
not review that part of the state court’s decision.
One commentator has argued that Boy Scout troops and dens, as
opposed to the national Boy Scouts organization, do in fact function
as “an extension of the boys’ families” and therefore should be pro108
tected by the right to intimate association.
Indeed, if one considers
the individual groups in which the Boy Scouts functions—the troops
and dens, consisting of anywhere from eight to twenty boys—then the
Boy Scouts organization shares at least four characteristics of many
families. First, like families, the troops are relatively small groups.
109
Second, minors are the focus of both groups. Third, the Boy Scouts
110
seeks to instill values in young people, a primary family function.
106

Dale v. Boy Scouts of Am., 734 A.2d 1196, 1221 (N.J. 1999) (quoting Bd. of
Dirs. of Rotary Int’l. v. Rotary Club, 481 U.S. 537, 546 (1987)).
107
In dissent, Justice Stevens dismissed the intimate association argument as “impossible.” Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 698 n.26 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
108
See John C. O’Quinn, “How Solemn Is the Duty of the Mighty Chief”: Mediating the
Conflict of Rights in Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 120 S.Ct 2446 (2000), 24 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 319, 357 (2000). The Boy Scouts even use some family terminology, assigning, for example, “den mothers” to each troop. See Poirer, supra note 88, at 277 n.17
(briefly discussing women’s roles in the Boy Scouts).
109
Of course, minors are not found in all families, nor does state recognition of
families hinge on the presence of minors. Even so, family law, as well as the broader
culture, often assumes that (at least heterosexual) adults will become parents and thus
will focus some amount of their attention on their children. See Dolgin, supra note 18,
at 362 (“[C]hildren remain central to understandings of family for both traditionalists
and modernists.”); cf. Hernandez v. Robles, 7 N.Y.3d 338, 378-79 (2006) (upholding a
ban on same-sex marriage largely because “marriage was instituted to address the fact
that sexual contact between a man and a woman naturally can result in pregnancy and
childbirth”). For a discussion and critique of this “repronormativity,” see Katherine M.
Franke, Theorizing Yes: An Essay on Feminism, Law, and Desire, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 181,
183-97 (2001).
110
See, e.g., Dailey, supra note 20, at 434-35 (discussing how parents leave their imprints on children during children’s development into fully realized citizens); Peggy
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Fourth, both the Boy Scouts and families allegedly seek to instill values
about gender and sex, aspects of identity that are foundational to state
111
definitions of marriage and the family. When one considers all four
characteristics together—when the Boy Scouts is seen as a series of
small groups made up of children and mentors performing a function
traditionally performed by the family about subjects that are at the
core of state definitions of family—it is plausible to conclude that the
Boy Scouts constitutes a family-like intimate association.
It is not necessary, however, for the Boy Scouts to constitute an intimate association in order to enjoy the protections that attach to parental childrearing. Protection of parental authority is not grounded
solely in First Amendment notions of intimate association. Indeed,
most protections of parental authority sound in privacy rather than in
speech or association. Constitutional rights to be left alone in one’s

Cooper Davis, Contested Images of Family Values: The Role of the State, 107 HARV. L. REV.
1348, 1371 (1994) (“For parents and other guardians, civil freedom brings a right to
choose and propagate values.”).
111
See NANCY F. COTT, PUBLIC VOWS: A HISTORY OF MARRIAGE AND THE NATION 3
(2d prtg. 2002) (describing how state laws concerning marriage “can shape the gender
order”). This does not mean, however, that states encourage parents and children to
talk about sex, or that states even permit parents to encourage their children to engage
in sexual activities. For example, children ordinarily may not consent to their own
medical care, but most states carve out exceptions that allow children to consent to
their own care for the diagnosis and treatment of sexually transmitted diseases and
pregnancy (except, in most states, when it comes to abortion). See, e.g., DOUGLAS E.
ABRAMS & SARAH H. RAMSEY, CHILDREN AND THE LAW: DOCTRINE, POLICY, AND PRACTICE 769-70 (2d ed. 2003) (noting that “[m]ost states” have “limited medical emancipation statutes”). A common justification for these exceptions is that children will be
too fearful or embarrassed to discuss these matters with their parents and, consequently, would not seek care if parental consent were required. Id. The state therefore does nothing to encourage discussions between parents and children and, in fact,
provides the means for children to avoid them. Similarly, many states require parental
consent or notification before a minor may obtain an abortion, but the minor must be
provided with the option to seek a judicial bypass if she is sufficiently mature and does
not wish to inform her parents. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 643 (1979).
On the other side of the coin, children can face charges under state statutory rape
laws even if they discussed their decision to engage in sexual activity with their parents
and the parents gave their blessings. See, e.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & NAN D.
HUNTER, SEXUALITY, GENDER, AND THE LAW 142-46 (2d ed. 2004) (detailing state “age
of consent” laws (internal quotation marks omitted)). Moreover, parents who have
consented to their children’s sexual experimentation have faced criminal charges. See,
e.g., Sharif Durhams, DA Prosecutes Mom Who Gave Son Condoms, MILWAUKEE J.SENTINEL, Jan. 15, 2001, available at http://www2.jsonline.com/news/metro/jan01/
condom15011401a.asp (reporting that felony charges were brought against a mother
in Sauk County, Wisconsin, for permitting her thirteen-year-old son to engage in sexual intercourse with his fifteen-year-old girlfriend).
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112

home and to direct the upbringing of one’s child pursuant to the
113
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment converge to give
parents almost complete authority over childrearing conducted within
the home. As the Supreme Court stated in 1968, “constitutional interpretation has consistently recognized that the parents’ claim to authority in their own household to direct the rearing of their children
114
is basic in the structure of our society.”
Parents are thus protected
from intrusions by the state in many contexts, although the protection
is not unlimited. Most notably, states may intervene in the parentchild relationship to further children’s welfare in four general ways:
intervening when there is abuse or neglect, requiring school attendance, limiting child labor outside of the home, and subjecting chil115
dren who violate the law to juvenile or adult criminal court.
Otherwise, parents have the right to direct the upbringing of their children,
including the right to control the messages their children receive
while under their care.

112

First articulated as early as the 1920s, this right has been reaffirmed on several
occasions. See, e.g., Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting) (describing the “right to be let alone” as the “right most valued by civilized
men”); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 568 (1969) (deeming statutes criminalizing
the “private possession of obscene material” unconstitutional while upholding the
right of states to regulate the distribution of pornography); Gregory v. City of Chicago,
394 U.S. 111, 125 (1969) (Black, J., concurring) (describing the home as “the sacred
retreat to which families repair for their privacy and their daily way of living”); Carey v.
Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 471 (1980) (reaffirming the value of “[p]reserving the sanctity of
the home”).
113
See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66 (2000) (plurality opinion) (“[I]t cannot
now be doubted that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects
the fundamental right of parents to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and
control of their children.”); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213-14 (1972) (“[T]he
values of parental direction of the religious upbringing and education of their children in their early and formative years have a high place in our society.”); Pierce v.
Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) (recognizing the right “of parents and
guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children under their control”);
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (discussing the right to “bring up children”); see also Troxel, 530 U.S. at 78 (Souter, J., concurring) (stating that parents have
the right to “indoctrinate children” and to choose their children’s social companions).
But see id. at 91-93 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (refusing to recognize a “theory of unenumerated parental rights”).
114
Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639 (1968).
115
See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166-67 (1944) (stating that “the state
has a wide range of power for limiting parental freedom and authority in things affecting the child’s welfare” and enumerating the first three exceptions to parental authority described above); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 17 (1967) (“If his parents default in effectively performing their custodial functions—that is, if the child is ‘delinquent’—the
state may intervene.”).
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Although broad, this parental privacy right may not seem broad
enough to encompass the childrearing activities of the Boy Scouts.
The right is frequently viewed as attaching to parents as individuals,
not to the family as a whole. Parents are endowed with individual le116
gal rights that can be balanced against the interests of the state.
Even when functioning as a parental surrogate, the Boy Scouts looks
like a group, not an individual. The dispute over Dale’s participation
in the group only highlights the fact that the Boy Scouts is not like an
individual with constitutional rights.
The Boy Scouts’s activities could still be protected by notions of
family privacy, however, because such privacy has also been extended
to the family as an entity. At common law, privacy attached to the
family as an entity, not to the individual members of the family, and it
117
encompassed virtually all family functions. This entity-based privacy
118
has also been recognized as a matter of constitutional law, creating
two complementary and converging sources of family privacy. Pursuant to this broader, entity-based conception of privacy, the state regulates the entity only upon formation—that is, in defining marriage,
parenthood, and the family itself—and in instances of what the state

116

See Dolgin, supra note 18, at 382 (describing both Meyer and Pierce as “premised
on a deep-seated fear of state control and on a presumption that parents enjoy a natural right of control over their children”); John H. Garvey, Child, Parent, State, and the
Due Process Clause: An Essay on the Supreme Court’s Recent Work, 51 S. CAL. L. REV. 769,
770 (1978) (“[I]f there are limits on what the state may do, it is because those who
have primary control over the child have an interest, protected by the due process
clause, in making decisions on the child’s behalf.”).
117
See Dolgin, supra note 18, at 347 (“The law, reflecting the larger society, long
presumed the autonomy of the family unit . . . .”); Martha Albertson Fineman, Intimacy
Outside of the Natural Family: The Limits of Privacy, 23 CONN. L. REV. 955, 966 (1991)
(“The common law privacy doctrine is not an individualized concept . . . it attaches to
the entity of the family, not to the individuals that compose it.”); Fineman, supra note
49, at 1212-15 (describing cases that “illustrate the contours of the common law doctrine of family privacy”); Vivian Hamilton, Principles of U.S. Family Law, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 31, 55 (2006) (describing how privacy historically “enable[d] the family,
under male authority, to function as a distinct unit within society”).
118
See Dailey, supra note 49, at 963 (“[S]ince the early part of this century, the family has been accorded constitutional protection independent of the liberties enjoyed by
its individual members.”); Janet L. Dolgin, The Family in Transition: From Griswold to
Eisenstadt and Beyond, 82 GEO. L.J. 1519, 1543-46 (1994) (discussing how the marital
unit as a whole was protected in Griswold, evoking common law notions of family privacy in a case about constitutional privacy, but in Eisenstadt, the protection was shifted
to the individuals involved in the sexual relationship, reflecting individual notions of
family privacy); see also Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979) (recognizing, in a case
litigated under the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause, that the family is “a
unit with broad parental authority over minor children”).
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perceives to be family breakdown, such as divorce or custody disputes,
119
or in cases of abuse or neglect.
In the absence of such breakdown,
120
most families, but not all, are accorded privacy by being placed
121
largely outside of the law’s reach.
The entity-based privacy right

119

See Fineman, supra note 49, at 1209 (noting that “the state is perceived as having a role only in the case of family default”); Martha Minow, Rights for the Next Generation: A Feminist Approach to Children’s Rights, 9 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 1, 7 (1986) (“Public
power becomes relevant only in exceptional circumstances, when parents default.”).
The state may also intervene when a parent dies, which could be viewed as the ultimate
form of default. See JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 116 (7th
ed. 2005) (discussing circumstances under which courts appoint “guardians of the person” for children when their parents die).
120
Families often are not accorded privacy when the state employs more expansive, and more questionable, definitions of family breakdown. For example, Dorothy
Roberts has illustrated how poor and African-American children are more likely to be
removed from their homes by the state than any other group of children. Dorothy E.
Roberts, Is There Justice in Children’s Rights?: The Critique of Federal Family Preservation Policy, 2 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 112, 125-26 (1999). Roberts effectively ties this removal rate to
stereotypes of African-American parents, rather than objective assessments of abuse.
Id. at 131. Martha Fineman has similarly illustrated how single mothers, particularly
those who are poor and receiving direct financial assistance from the state, are deprived of entity-based privacy. Fineman, supra note 117, at 958-59; see also Naomi R.
Cahn, Models of Family Privacy, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1225, 1243 (1999) (“A family’s
dependence on public aid has typically meant forgoing otherwise applicable privacy
rights . . . .”); Martin Guggenheim, Somebody’s Children: Sustaining the Family’s Place in
Child Welfare Policy, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1716, 1724-26 (2000) (book review) (discussing
studies indicating that children are most often removed from their home because of
poverty, rather than physical abuse). For a brief historical discussion of how some
families have been more protected by family privacy than others, see Rutherford, supra
note 19, at 634-35 (observing that “[g]ood families,” those consisting of married parents and their natural children, “received nearly absolute protection” from state intervention, “while bad families,” those following other models, “had virtually none”).
121
The primary exceptions to this regime of entity-based privacy are statemandated medical tests for newborns and vaccinations for children. See, e.g., Douglas
County v. Anaya, 694 N.W.2d 601, 608 (Neb. 2005) (mandating metabolic testing for
newborns despite parental objections on religious grounds).
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that protects the family thus goes beyond individual protections,
123
removing the family as an entity from the zone of state power.
Given the dependence of children, at least young ones, on their
parents, this entity-based privacy usually amounts to parental autonomy—the right of parents to speak for their children and to make de124
cisions about their upbringing, free from state intrusion. As before,
122

Indeed, entity-based family privacy is often reined in by the constitutional
rights of individuals, because those individual rights can be invoked against other family members. See Dailey, supra note 49, at 1019 (“Under the doctrine of individual privacy, the state has a basis from which it may penetrate the intimate family unit.”);
David D. Meyer, Domesticating Lawrence, 2004 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 453, 481 (noting “the
possibility that constitutional privacy will be invoked by one family member against another in intrafamily disputes”). State laws permitting unilateral no-fault divorce also
could be seen as providing individuals with the tools to overcome entity-based family
privacy. Cf. GROSSBERG, supra note 90, at 29-30 (describing how, in the nineteenth
century, the importance given to entity-based privacy meant that conflicts between individuals and families were generally resolved in favor of the family).
123
See Bruce C. Hafen, Children’s Liberation and the New Egalitarianism: Some Reservations About Abandoning Youth to Their “Rights”, 1976 BYU L. REV. 605, 617 (describing
common law privacy as “plenary,” meaning that parental power “prevail[s] over the
claims of the state, other outsiders, and the children themselves unless there is some
compelling justification for interference”); Rutherford, supra note 19, at 631 (stating
that, traditionally, “[t]he inherent value placed on family unity meant that courts were
reluctant to intervene in family affairs on behalf of individuals”).
124
Because entity-based privacy exempts families from state power only, it does
little to protect vulnerable family members, particularly children, from internal family
disputes or other displays of power. See, e.g., Lee E. Teitelbaum, Family History and Family Law, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 1135, 1174-80 (discussing how family privacy historically reinforced husbands’ authority over their wives and children). Thus, children can be adversely affected by the legal exemptions that result from entity-based family privacy. See
Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, The Dark Side of Family Privacy, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
1247, 1255 (1999) (arguing that preventing “state intervention in a ‘unit’ composed of
members of unequal power . . . means that the dominant member is free to engage in
clearly (although not grossly) wrongful conduct while the dependent members are
compelled to suffer it”); cf. Dolgin, supra note 103, at 346 (“[A]n evolutionary shift toward the recognition of adults within families as autonomous individuals became revolutionary in the last decades of the twentieth century. Society did not, however, comparably reconstruct its understanding of children, and it still views them as dependant
and vulnerable.” (footnotes omitted)).
Moreover, constitutional notions of privacy rarely endow children with rights that
can be invoked against their parents. See, e.g., Lee E. Teitelbaum, Children’s Rights and
the Problem of Equal Respect, 27 HOFSTRA L. REV. 799, 810-15 (1999) (attempting to answer the question: “But how can the Supreme Court have held that children have
autonomy-based rights in the midst of a legal setting that supposes that children are
obliged to accept parental and governmental control regarding health, education,
housing, and the like?”). Notable exceptions include the rights of adolescents, without
parental consent, to obtain contraception, Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S.
678, 693-702 (1977) (plurality opinion), and to seek an abortion upon a judicial finding of sufficient maturity, Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 643-44 (1979); see also Garvey,
supra note 116, at 789-805 (discussing Bellotti and Carey and exploring possible reasons
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this autonomy is tempered by the state’s interest in protecting and
125
educating future citizens.
Parents must therefore send their children to school, or create a school within their home, and must abide
by legitimate educational requirements imposed by the state. Once
out of school and within the home, however, parents are outside of
the zone of state power. Parents are thus free to impart to their children whatever values they please and to exclude anyone they choose
126
from the family home.
The Boy Scouts, as an entity engaged in childrearing, could arguably be entitled to similar autonomy. Once parents decide to delegate a portion of their childrearing authority to the Boy Scouts, then
the Boy Scouts may, under this reasoning, make determinations, free
from state intervention, about who may rear the children under its
care. Indeed, Dale could be read as suggesting that the state should
defer to childrearing decisions even when childrearing is performed
outside of the home, by organizations that do not look like the traditional family, but which function as parental surrogates. This family
law analysis could provide the majority opinion in Dale with some
127
much needed coherence.
One objection to such an analysis is that courts have traditionally
recognized parental authority with respect to household and educational matters only. Most notably, the Supreme Court held in Prince v.
Massachusetts that parental prerogatives did not trump state interests

for granting these rare rights to minors in the contexts of contraception and abortion). Minors may also seek emancipation from their parents as a matter of state law.
See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 7120 (West 2003).
125
See Hafen, supra note 123, at 625 (“The common law and constitutional developments concerning parental rights are mutually reinforcing and arrive at the same
basic posture—children should be subject to the custody and control of their natural
parents until the parents’ conduct falls below the minimum standards established [by
the state].”).
126
Perhaps most notably, parents may even exclude a child’s grandparents.
Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 69-70 (2000).
127
To my knowledge, other scholars have not explicitly analyzed Dale along these
entity-based family privacy lines. For analyses that are close, see Eskridge, Lawrence’s
Jurisprudence of Tolerance, supra note 87, at 1075-76 (reading Dale as telling traditionalists
that “gay people [cannot] do bad things to you,” and that “[y]our youth group is a
safe place for you to express and inculcate your values, and it goes without saying that
your home, your church, your parochial school, your other normative associations are
all enclaves where the state cannot impose politically correct or progay values on
you”); Shiffrin, supra note 74, at 885-86 (stating that “[t]he best case for recognizing a
strong association right in Dale is to think of the Boy Scouts as an association of parents
and their children, one that involves the participation of other adults to promote its
purposes,” but relying primarily on the First Amendment to support that claim).
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in upholding a state law prohibiting children from distributing religious literature on street corners, even when the child in question did
128
so with her guardian’s permission.
The traditional focus on home
and school in considerations of parents’ rights has led some judges to
limit parental authority to those spaces. This limitation may be due to
the fact that analyses of parental rights often consider the parents’ individual rights only. For example, in rejecting parents’ challenge to a
local curfew law, the D.C. Circuit stated:
[I]nsofar as a parent can be thought to have a fundamental right, as
against the state, in the upbringing of his or her children, that right is
focused on the [parent’s] control of the home and the [parent’s] interest in controlling, if he or she wishes, the formal education of chil129
dren.

A broader, entity-based conception of family privacy supports a
different conclusion. For example, a concurring judge in the same
D.C. Circuit opinion stated:
[A] parent’s stake in the rearing of his or her child surely extends beyond the front door of the family residence and even beyond the school
classroom. . . . [P]arents throughout our history . . . have imposed restrictions on their children’s dating habits, driving, movie selections,
part-time jobs, and places to visit, and . . . have permitted, paid for, and
supported their children’s activities in sports programs, summer camps,
tutorial counseling, college selection, and scores of other such activities,
130
all arising outside of the family residence and school classroom.

The Dale holding could similarly be read to indicate that childrearing will be protected from state intrusion even when it occurs outside of the home. Moreover, Dale also could be read as extending that
protection to parental surrogates. Privacy follows the function of the
entity, not its form. Under this interpretation, notions of family privacy and parental authority are expanded to protect outsourced childrearing in the spaces between home and school. As such, these spaces
are enveloped by an extension of the privacy of the home.

128

321 U.S. 158, 167-70 (1944).
Hutchins v. District of Columbia, 188 F.3d 531, 540-41 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (en
banc) (plurality opinion).
130
Id. at 549-50 (Edwards, J., concurring); see also id. at 550 (“The [Supreme]
Court has never limited its definition of parental rights to include only the right to supervise activities that take place literally inside the home or literally inside the classroom. Indeed, such a limitation is implausible.”).
129
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B. Extending School: Considering the State’s Interests
Childrearing between home and school need not be viewed as an
extension of the childrearing performed by parents within the home.
Another approach is to view childrearing between home and school as
an extension of school, confining parental prerogatives (and those of
their surrogates) to the privacy of the home. Notions of family privacy
are tempered by the state’s interest in educating future citizens. If
this interest is predominant in the school setting, it also could govern
the spaces between home and school.
In the school context, parents still have a right, at home, to impart to their children whatever values they choose. That right does
not extend into school, however. Because the state has an interest
in educating future citizens, parents must send their children to
131
school, and parents are given no opportunity, beyond electing local
school officials, to dictate how public schools teach their children.
Those officials—not children’s parents—determine issues such as
132
public school curricula and requirements, student disciplinary pro131

See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213 (1972) (“There is no doubt as to the
power of a State, having a high responsibility for education of its citizens, to impose
reasonable regulations for the control and duration of basic education.”); Prince, 321
U.S. at 166 (“Acting to guard the general interest in youth’s well being, the state as
parens patriae may restrict the parent’s control by requiring school attendance . . . .”);
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923) (“The American people have always regarded education and acquisition of knowledge as matters of supreme importance
which should be diligently promoted.”).
132
See Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 681-83 (1986) (stating that
a legitimate objective of public education is “‘inculcat[ing] fundamental values necessary to the maintenance of a democratic political system’” (quoting Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 77 (1979))); Blau v. Fort Thomas Pub. Sch. Dist., 401 F.3d 381, 39596 (6th Cir. 2005) (“Whether it is the school curriculum, the hours of the school day,
school discipline, the timing and content of examinations, the individuals hired to
teach at the school, the extracurricular activities offered at the school or, as here, a
dress code, these issues of public education are generally ‘committed to the control of
state and local authorities.’” (quoting Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 578 (1975))); Leebaert v. Harrington, 332 F.3d 134, 142 (2d Cir. 2003) (stating that parents’ right to direct the upbringing of their children does not include “the right to tell public schools
what to teach or what not to teach” their children); Herndon v. Chapel Hill-Carrboro
City Bd. of Educ., 89 F.3d 174, 176 (4th Cir. 1996) (holding that a high school may require community service despite parents’ objections); Immediato v. Rye Neck Sch.
Dist., 73 F.3d 454, 462 (2d Cir. 1996) (same); Brown v. Hot, Sexy & Safer Prods., Inc.,
68 F.3d 525, 533-41 (1st Cir. 1995) (holding that parents have no right to control or
modify sex education curriculum that emphasizes sexual pleasure).
The state’s role in determining school curricula and requirements extends to determining which students are eligible for school sports. See Kite v. Marshall, 661 F.2d
1027, 1028, 1029 (Former 5th Cir. Nov. 1981) (upholding a rule that prohibited high
school students from participating in varsity sports if they attended certain summer
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134

cedures, and teacher hiring policies.
Parents generally may opt
out of these requirements only by choosing to send their children to
private schools or by establishing a school in their own home—and by
135
bearing the cost of either choice.
But even parents who choose to
send their children to nonpublic schools are subject to some state
regulation in order to further the state’s interest in educating future
citizens. For instance, states may seek to enforce minimum educa136
tional standards.
Parents also may not invoke their parental rights
to escape the effect of antidiscrimination laws to which schools, both
137
public and private, are subject.
Instead, the state’s interest in regu-

training camps on the ground that parents did not have “a fundamental right to send
their children to summer athletic camps,” and children did not have “a constitutional
right to attend” such camps). But see Laurenzo v. Miss. High Sch. Activities Ass’n, 662
F.2d 1117, 1119-20 (5th Cir. Unit A Dec. 1981) (recognizing that a school rule requiring students to live with the parent to whom legal custody had been granted or face a
one-year suspension from interscholastic competition could infringe on “the right of
the family to determine living arrangements,” but dismissing the case as moot).
133
See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 662 (1977) (“[T]he concept of parental
delegation has been replaced by the view—more consonant with compulsory education laws—that the State itself may impose such corporal punishment as is reasonably
necessary . . . .”).
134
See Blau, 401 F.3d at 395-96 (stating that various aspects of public school, including “the individuals hired to teach at the school” are “‘committed to the control of
state and local authorities’” (quoting Goss, 419 U.S. at 578)). Public schools, like private schools, are also subject to Title VII. See infra text accompanying note 143; see also
Ponton v. Newport News Sch. Bd., 632 F. Supp. 1056, 1064 (E.D. Va. 1986) (“The
School Board and its employees clearly qualify as ‘employers’ within the meaning of
[Title VII].”).
135
Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268, U.S., 510, 535 (1925) (“The fundamental theory
of liberty upon which all governments in this Union repose excludes any general
power of the State to standardize its children by forcing them to accept instruction
from public teachers only.”); see also Blau, 401 F.3d at 395 (recognizing that parents do
“have a fundamental right to decide whether to send their child to a public school,” but
also noting that “they do not have a fundamental right generally to direct how a public
school teaches their child”); Fields v. Palmdale Sch. Dist., 427 F.3d 1197, 1206 (9th Cir.
2005) (“[O]nce parents make the choice as to which school their children will attend,
their fundamental right to control the education of their children is, at the least, substantially diminished.”).
136
Yoder, 406 U.S. at 239 (White, J., concurring) (“[Pierce] lends no support to the
contention that parents may replace state educational requirements with their own
idiosyncratic views of what knowledge a child needs to be a productive and happy
member of society . . . .”).
137
See, e.g., Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 462-63 (1973) (rejecting the claim
that parental rights would be violated if the state refused to loan textbooks to all-white
private schools, and holding that, although parents have a right to send their children
to private schools, and although states have a “special interest in elevating the quality
of education in both public and private schools,” states are not required to “grant aid
to private schools without regard to constitutionally mandated standards forbidding
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lating discrimination, and in instilling the value of nondiscrimination,
trumps any parental interest in using schools to practice the virtues of
discrimination.
138
For example, in Runyon v. McCrary, a Supreme Court case decided in 1976, parents with children attending all-white private
schools argued that their parental right to teach the value of segregation would be violated if the schools were forced, pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1981, to admit African-American students. The Court recognized that the parents, under the First and Fourteenth Amendments,
had a constitutional right to impart to their children whatever values
and standards they deemed desirable, including the value of segrega139
tion. The Court concluded, however, that the parents’ rights would
not be violated if the schools were required to admit AfricanAmerican students, because “‘there is no showing that discontinuance
of [the] discriminatory admission practices would inhibit in any way
140
the teaching in these schools of any ideas or dogma.’”
In other
words, the Court found that the mere presence of African-American
students would not prevent the parents or the school from teaching
that segregation is desirable.
Returning to Dale, if the Boy Scouts is analogized to a private
school, instead of to a parent, then Runyon suggests that the Boy
Scouts cannot exclude Dale simply by invoking a desire to teach by
example. Just as the schools in Runyon were not exempt from § 1981,
the Boy Scouts would not be exempt from New Jersey’s public accommodations law. Moreover, application of the New Jersey law
would not automatically, or even necessarily, change the subject mat-

state-supported discrimination”); see also infra notes 138-143 and accompanying text
(discussing Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976), and Title VII).
138
427 U.S. 160 (1976).
139
Id. at 176-77.
140
Id. at 176 (quoting McCrary v. Runyon, 515 F.2d 1082, 1087 (4th Cir. 1975)).
Accordingly, the Runyon Court rejected the parents’ First Amendment argument by
drawing a distinction between speech and conduct. See id. (“[I]t may be assumed that
parents have a First Amendment right to send their children to educational institutions that promote the belief that racial segregation is desirable, and that the children
have an equal right to attend such institutions. But it does not follow that the practice
of excluding racial minorities from such institutions is also protected by the same principle.” (first emphasis added)). Some commentators have suggested that the Dale
Court implicitly overruled this aspect of Runyon by holding that Dale’s mere presence
would hinder the Boy Scouts’s message. See, e.g., Hunter, supra note 74, at 1603 (“The
Dale majority simply ignores Runyon.”). However, such an interpretation also could
mean that Dale overruled Jaycees, unless private schools are seen as fundamentally different from other private associations.

872

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 155: 833

ter of the Boy Scouts’s teaching. Rather, the Boy Scouts could continue to espouse its views on sexuality despite Dale’s presence, particularly if, as indicated in the record, none of Dale’s troop members
141
knew that he was gay. Additionally, even if the troop members knew
about Dale’s sexuality, that facet of his identity would not prevent
Dale from conforming his teachings to those desired by the Boy
Scouts or, similar to the holding in Runyon, prevent the Boy Scouts
from otherwise conveying its desired message to the boys under its
care.
Analogizing the Boy Scouts to a private school in this manner is
tempting because the Boy Scouts’s activities are similar to school activities. In both instances, children of approximately the same age,
and with different parents, come together to learn as a group. Runyon
does not serve as a perfect analogy, however, because James Dale was
not seeking to be a youth member of the Boy Scouts. Rather, Dale was
seeking re-admittance as a troop leader, making him more like a
teacher at a private school than a student.
Acknowledging Dale’s teacher-like role does not change the fact
that schools are subject to antidiscrimination laws. Private schools
may require their teachers to serve as role models, mandating that
their behavior not conflict with the lessons the school is trying to
142
teach. As such, private schools that ask students to remain abstinent
until marriage may fire teachers who become pregnant out of wedlock. However, as Runyon indicates, schools may not do so if termination would violate state or federal antidiscrimination laws. For example, because Title VII prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex,
such schools may dismiss unwed pregnant teachers only if they also
143
fire male teachers who become fathers out of wedlock.
In Dale, this
141

See supra text accompanying notes 84-85.
See Mark Yudof, Three Faces of Academic Freedom, 32 LOY. L. REV. 831, 853 (1987)
(“[A] parochial school cannot convey its religious message[] if it is required to allow
teachers to discuss the pros and cons of abortion or birth control.”).
143
See, e.g., Boyd v. Harding Acad. of Memphis, Inc., 88 F.3d 410, 414 (6th Cir.
1996) (“Although Title VII requires that this code of conduct be applied equally to
both sexes, defendant presented uncontroverted evidence at trial that [the president
of the school] had terminated at least four individuals, both male and female, who had
engaged in extramarital sexual relationships . . . .” (citation omitted)); Ganzy v. Allen
Christian Sch., 995 F. Supp. 340, 349 (E.D.N.Y. 1998) (“[R]estrictions on sexual activity, applied equally to males and females, are not discriminatory.”); Vigars v. Valley
Christian Ctr., 805 F. Supp. 802, 806-07 (N.D. Cal. 1992) (holding that religious employers may discriminate on the basis of religion, but not sex); Dolter v. Wahlert High
Sch., 483 F. Supp. 266, 270 n.5 (N.D. Iowa 1980) (“For example, if single male teachers
at [the high school], known to have engaged in pre-marital sex, were equally dis142
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approach would mean that the Boy Scouts could not exclude Dale
simply because he self-identified as a gay man, because New Jersey’s
public accommodations law prohibits discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation. Rather, if the Boy Scouts wished to exclude Dale,
it would be required to investigate the sexual conduct of all of its
troop leaders and show how particular sexual behavior conflicted with
the lessons it attempts to impart.
Of course, the above analysis depends on the Boy Scouts being
analogized to a school, instead of to a parental surrogate. Runyon is
instructive, however, even if the Boy Scouts is viewed as a parental surrogate. Runyon emphasizes that parents do not have complete control
over the rearing of their children; rather, parents must heed state
mandates when their children are at school, even when their children
attend private schools. If parents are subject to such restrictions, then
certainly parental surrogates, like the Boy Scouts, could be similarly
constrained. Therefore, the Boy Scouts could be subject to New Jersey’s public accommodations law.
An interesting counterpoint to Runyon and Dale can be found in
the example of home schooling. In contrast to Dale, in which a family
function traditionally performed in the home could be seen as moving outside of the home, home schooling involves a function normally
performed outside of the home being moved inside. If parents have
complete control over childrearing within the home, then the state’s
regulation of education should stop at the home’s front door. Yet this
is not the case. The state follows education into the home despite notions of family privacy and parents’ rights to direct the upbringing of
144
their children.
Parental authority thus is not spatially determined, but instead is
based on the type of childrearing being performed. If the childrearing is more in the nature of educating children to become informed

charged[,] any inference of sexual discrimination otherwise shown might be dissipated.”). For an argument that such cases were wrongly decided, and that private
schools should be shielded from antidiscrimination laws when hiring and firing teachers, see Dale Carpenter, Expressive Association and Anti-Discrimination Law After Dale: A
Tripartite Approach, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1515, 1577 (2001).
144
States may regulate home schooling by mandating, inter alia, the minimum
qualifications of the instructor, the curriculum, the number of days of instruction, the
standardized tests that must be administered, and parental reporting obligations. See,
e.g., Blackwelder v. Safnauer, 689 F. Supp. 106, 128-37 (N.D.N.Y. 1988) (upholding
state regulation of home schooling against parents’ free exercise and privacy challenges); HARRIS & TEITELBAUM, supra note 13, at 76 (discussing the wide variation of
home schooling regulation by and among the states).
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future citizens, then the state will enter the home and impose stan145
dards that may conflict with parental desires.
Yet, in moving from
the public to the private sphere, the state becomes less prescriptive
and more deferential to parental prerogatives. Indeed, the state increasingly defers to parents as education moves from public schools to
private schools to the home. Likewise, when the childrearing traditionally performed within the home moves to organizations outside of
the home, it is conceivable that the privacy accorded to such childrearing should gradually give way to state interests.
The case that has given the most deference to parental authority
146
to date, Wisconsin v. Yoder, could be read to support such an approach. In that case, the Supreme Court held that Amish parents
could remove their children from school after the eighth grade to
protect them from worldly values, despite compulsory education laws
147
mandating school attendance until the age of sixteen.
The Court’s
decision depended on unique elements of the Amish faith, particularly its emphasis on living a simple life grounded in farming and its
ethic of helping its members during times of trouble, instead of re148
sorting to the support of the state.
Indeed, the Court emphasized
that its holding was not grounded solely in its respect for secular parental prerogatives: “A way of life, however virtuous and admirable,
may not be interposed as a barrier to reasonable state regulation of
149
education if it is based on purely secular considerations . . . .”
Instead, the Court respected parental authority because it was necessary
to maintain a religion outside of mainstream society and to equip
children to live within that religion. No one suggested that the Amish
could seek to achieve their parental goals by policing what happens at
150
schools or at other sites in the public realm.

145

One commentator has relied on this distinction between types of childrearing
to explain the different outcomes in Dale and Runyon. See Karen Lim, Note, Freedom to
Exclude After Boy Scouts of America v. Dale: Do Private Schools Have a Right To Discriminate Against Homosexual Teachers?, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 2599, 2639 (2003) (“Simply
stated, Runyon involved the state’s interest in liberal education and Dale did not. . . .
The work of schools lies at the core of a state’s interest in education; the activity of the
Boy Scouts is peripheral.”).
146
406 U.S. 205 (1972).
147
Id. at 234-36.
148
Id. at 209-13, 216-19.
149
Id. at 215.
150
And indeed, attempts by non-Amish parents to do so have been rejected. See,
e.g., Duro v. Dist. Attorney, 712 F.2d 96, 98-99 (4th Cir. 1983); Davis v. Page, 385 F.
Supp. 395, 400-05 (D.N.H. 1974).
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Applying this analysis to the Boy Scouts would mean, at the very
least, that the Boy Scouts should not be permitted to operate completely outside the zone of state power. Rather, as an entity functioning between home and school, the Boy Scouts should be subject to
some state-imposed limitations. Such an approach could ultimately
support outcomes that are quite different from the majority’s holding
in Dale.
III. EMBRACING THE SPACES OF CHILDHOOD WITHIN FAMILY LAW
Analogizing childrearing that takes place between home and
school to the childrearing that takes place at either home or school
may help make sense of the holding in Dale, but it also may provide a
foundation for an alternative holding. These conflicting outcomes
indicate that analogies to home or school will rarely be dispositive.
They do, however, provide a useful vehicle for examining existing approaches to childrearing within family law, and exploring how those
approaches might be extended to childrearing that takes place between home and school. The analogies also highlight the limits of the
existing scope of family law, namely its failure to recognize that the
spaces between home and school may be distinct from both home and
school, rendering analogies to either concept ultimately inapposite.
This Part calls for a theory that acknowledges childrearing between home and school for what it is, as opposed to how it is similar to
the childrearing that takes place at either home or school. The first
Section situates the call for such a theory in relation to existing attempts within family law to reflect more accurately the reality of family
life. The next Section explores the necessity of such a theory by discussing several factual scenarios that the theory could address. Finally, the last Section explores potential contours and implications of
the theory.
A. Extending the Functional Approach
Recognizing the distinct reality of childrearing that takes place between home and school would be consistent with recent family law reforms designed to acknowledge the diverse reality of family life. Several states now permit same-sex couples to be considered legal families
151
for all or some purposes, and stepchildren and other “de facto”
151

See Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 969-70 (Mass. 2003)
(recognizing same-sex marriage); CAL. FAM. CODE § 297.5 (West Supp. 2006) (extend-
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children are increasingly recognized as legal family members, even in
152
the absence of adoption or biological ties.
These new legal approaches to the family encompass more of the ways people actually
live their lives. Many people who consider themselves to be family,
but who traditionally have not enjoyed the legal status of family, now
are entitled to legal benefits and protections either because they sat153
isfy a functional test or, more commonly, because they fall within
154
expanded definitions of legally recognized families.
These changes in family law are the result, in large part, of legal
scholarship that questioned why legal acknowledgement remained
limited to the traditional nuclear family when various other associations function in very similar ways. For example, Martha Minow has
argued that groups of people who socialize their members and provide each other both life necessities and emotional security should be
155
considered families for many purposes.
Likewise, Barbara Bennett

ing family recognition to registered domestic partners); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b38nn (West Supp. 2006) (extending family recognition to couples in registered civil
unions); HAW. REV. STAT. § 572C-1 (Supp. 2005) (extending family recognition to registered reciprocal beneficiaries); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 1-201(10-A), (17),
(20) (2005) (extending family recognition with respect to inheritance rights to registered domestic partners); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:8A (West Supp. 2006) (extending partial family recognition to registered domestic partners); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1204
(2002) (extending family recognition to couples in registered civil unions); Lewis v.
Harris, 908 A.2d 196, 224 (N.J. 2006) (holding that same-sex couples are entitled to all
of the state benefits that heterosexual married couples enjoy).
152
See generally John DeWitt Gregory, Defining the Family in the Millennium: The
Troxel Follies, 32 U. MEM. L. REV. 687, 689-712 (2002) (describing cases and statutes
extending some childrearing rights to grandparents, stepparents, foster parents, coparents, and de facto parents); Developments in the Law: The Law of Marriage and Family,
116 HARV. L. REV. 1996, 2052-64 (2003) (same); see also ALI, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF
FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.03, at 107-08, 118-24
(2002) [hereinafter PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION] (proposing increased legal recognition of de facto parents).
153
See, e.g., Braschi v. Stahl Assocs. Co., 543 N.E.2d 49, 53-55 (N.Y. 1989) (using a
functional analysis to define cohabiting same-sex partners as “family” for the purposes
of New York’s rent-control laws). But see Allison D. v. Virginia M., 572 N.E.2d 27, 29-30
(N.Y. 1991) (refusing to recognize a biological mother’s former same-sex partner as a
de facto parent for visitation purposes); In re Estate of Cooper, 187 A.D.2d 128, 131-32
(N.Y. App. Div. 1993) (denying testator’s former same-sex partner the right to an elective share of testator’s estate because he did not qualify as a “husband” or “wife”).
154
As such, status is still privileged over function, but legal status sometimes includes more of the ways that people live as families. See supra notes 151-152 and accompanying text. Of course, many people still are excluded from the definition of
family in many states.
155
See Martha Minow, All in the Family & in All Families: Membership, Loving, and
Owing, 95 W. VA. L. REV. 275, 287-88 (1992-1993) [hereinafter Minow, All in the Family];
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Woodhouse has argued that family law should recognize groups that
nurture and support their household members, even if those in the
156
support unit do not fit the traditional nuclear family form.
Such
157
scholarship, and the reforms following it, view the proper role of
family law as reflecting and supporting individuals’ choices about the
people with whom they share their lives.
This functional approach to the family need not stop at family
personnel. If a goal of family law is to support families according to
the realities of contemporary family life, then family law scholars and
reformers must consider not only family composition, but also how—
and where—family functions are performed. Such considerations have
158
been largely absent from recent scholarship and reform proposals.
Instead, the new families increasingly recognized by the law tend to
function very much like the traditional nuclear family, just with differ159
ent personnel.
New people perform the same functions that have

Martha Minow, Redefining Families: Who’s In and Who’s Out?, 62 U. COLO. L. REV. 269,
270-72 (1991).
156
See Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, “It All Depends on What You Mean by Home”:
Toward a Communitarian Theory of the “Nontraditional” Family, 1996 UTAH L. REV. 569,
576-84; Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Towards a Revitalization of Family Law, 69 TEX. L.
REV. 245, 279-80 (1990) (book review) (suggesting that the critical inquiry is “not
whether the family form look[s] like a family, but whether it act[s] like one”).
157
For other examples, see Bartlett, supra note 11, at 944-51 (proposing “[t]he
concept of nonexclusive parenthood” in order to “permit[] recognition of de facto
parenting relationships without severing the child’s relationships with natural or legal
parents”); Nancy E. Dowd, Fathers and the Supreme Court: Founding Fathers and Nurturing
Fathers, 54 EMORY L.J. 1271, 1309-20 (2005) (setting out a “redefinition of fatherhood
around nurture”); Nancy D. Polikoff, This Child Does Have Two Mothers: Redefining Parenthood To Meet the Needs of Children in Lesbian-Mother and Other Nontraditional Families, 78
GEO. L.J. 459, 573 (1990) (concluding that “courts should redefine parenthood to include anyone in a functional parental relationship that a legally recognized parent
created with the intent that an additional parent-child relationship exist”).
158
This has not always been the case. Most notably, in the 1960s and 1970s, family
law scholars and activists responded to the gradual acceptance of gender equality by
arguing that the law should no longer allocate spousal functions along gender lines.
Legislatures and courts responded relatively quickly by eliminating official gender
roles within the family. See MCCLAIN, supra note 5, at 60-61 (tracing the progress, since
the 1960s, of judicial and legislative efforts to eradicate laws treating men and women
differently based on “the patriarchal model of family governance”); Susan Frelich Appleton, Missing in Action? Searching for Gender Talk in the Same-Sex Marriage Debate, 16
STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 97, 110-14 (2005) (describing the erosion of official gender
roles in American family law over the past thirty years).
159
For an excellent critique of this development, and of relying on function to expand definitions of the family in general, see Vivian Hamilton, Mistaking Marriage for
Social Policy, 11 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 307, 319-23 (2004). Hamilton’s critique is limited, however, to the desirability of using functional tests to determine changing family
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been legally recognized in the past. Adults in these families tend to be
sexually involved with each other, much like they would be under traditional definitions of marriage, and the children are often blood re160
lations of at least one of the adults.
Moreover, these new families
are recognized as functioning almost entirely in what continues to be
considered a private realm, the sphere to which law has relegated
most of family life. In other words, the identities of family members
may have changed, but the functions of family recognized by the law
have, for the most part, remained static.
New approaches to the “who” of family thus risk reinforcing existing notions of the “how” of family. Such reinforcement would coincide with the goals of family law scholars and reformers only if existing
family law adequately reflected and supported the ways that families
actually function. That may be the case with respect to some aspects
161
of adult familial relationships, but it seems much less likely with respect to parent-child interactions.
As discussed in Part I above, childrearing has never been confined
to the home, even when children are not at school; rather, multiple
actors have long engaged in childrearing in the spaces between home
personnel. She, like other family scholars, does not explicitly consider how such tests
also could respond to other ways in which families have changed.
160
See David D. Meyer, Self-Definition in the Constitution of Faith and Family, 86 MINN.
L. REV. 791, 794 (2002) (noting that, in the context of constitutional rights such as privacy, new definitions of family have not embraced “more novel intimate configurations”). For example, when the American Law Institute proposed that its model family
dissolution default rules be extended to all domestic partnerships, it defined such
partnerships as those that function like marriage. See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION, supra note 152, § 6.03, at 916-19.
161
Though many changes have occurred with respect to dating patterns, acceptance of same-sex relationships, and the age of commitment, once adults decide to
commit to long-term relationships, those relationships tend to be sexual relationships
performed in the private realm, much like in the past. It seems that few adult couples
in sexual relationships attempt to engage in sexual relations in the public realm (although they may want to), and that few adult couples live together solely on platonic
terms. But such choices may be the product of the law’s failure to recognize, or support, such activities. Cf. MILTON C. REGAN, JR., FAMILY LAW AND THE PURSUIT OF
INTIMACY 136 (1993) (describing the channeling function of family law by emphasizing
how “law may shape behavior in complex ways through its affirmation or condemnation of various types of conduct”); Carl E. Schneider, The Channelling Function in
Family Law, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 495 (1992) (same). For a discussion of proposals to
expand family definitions to include platonic domestic arrangements, see Nancy D.
Polikoff, Ending Marriage as We Know It, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 201, 203-09, 218-25 (2003)
(discussing, inter alia, the Canadian approach as outlined in LAW COMM’N OF CAN.,
BEYOND CONJUGALITY: RECOGNIZING AND SUPPORTING CLOSE PERSONAL ADULT
RELATIONSHIPS (2001), available at http://epe.lac-bac.gc.ca/100/200/301/lcc-cdc/
beyond-conjugality-e/pdf/37152-e.pdf).
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162

and school.
Moreover, given middle-class women’s increasing participation in the paid work force, and the greater demands of work in
general, childrearing has been increasingly outsourced to various ac163
tors in these spaces.
Recent changes in family life thus involve not
only changes to the composition of family, but also changes in how,
and where, some families perform their childrearing functions. The
existing functional approach to the family has yet to consider these
facts. Family law’s silence in this area risks reinforcing erroneous notions that childrearing is performed solely by parents or the state, at
home or at school.
Such silence does more than create inaccurate impressions; it also
can shape aspects of family life by specifying which childrearing activities are worthy of legal protections—through either regulation or ex164
plicit nonregulation —and which are not. Family law’s current focus
on home and school most likely contributes to the salience of those
sites for parents and children. In particular, because parental rights
are perceived to be most protected when childrearing takes place in
the home, family law scholars must acknowledge that their silence
about childrearing between home and school could contribute to the
privatization of family life, by reinforcing the perception that child-

162

See, e.g., CREMIN, supra note 31, at 298-302 (discussing the rise of “formal and
informal day nurseries,” beginning in the 1870s, which addressed the needs of both
single-parent families and families where both parents worked outside of the home).
163
The federal government acknowledged this fact when it passed the Family and
Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2654 (2000), which mandates only
twelve weeks of unpaid work leave after the birth or adoption of a child. Id.
§ 2612(a)(1)(A); see also Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 728-40
(2003) (detailing the history, mechanics, and rationale of the Family and Medical
Leave Act). Presumably, most workers return to work after this leave, but the demands
of childrearing will remain, necessitating that childrearing be performed by actors outside of the family unit. In addition, the federal government has, in one context, mandated the outsourcing of childrearing by requiring mothers who receive public assistance to work outside of the home. See, e.g., Dorothy Roberts, Welfare Reform and
Economic Freedom: Low-Income Mothers’ Decisions About Work at Home and in the Market, 44
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1029, 1041-57 (2004) (noting the surge in demand for childcare
after the passage of work requirements for public assistance recipients and the pressure placed on recipients to value employment over childcare).
164
JEAN L. COHEN & ANDREW ARATO, CIVIL SOCIETY AND POLITICAL THEORY 352
(1994) (“[T]he private and even the intimate ‘spheres’ have always been constituted
and regulated by law, even if what is constituted includes a domain of autonomous
judgment that can come into conflict with law.”); Minow, supra note 119, at 7-8 n.15
(stating that the state’s “noninvolvement in family matters expresses its approval, or at
least its lack of disapproval, of what goes on in the private realm”).
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rearing is a purely private activity and perhaps even encouraging some
165
parents to keep children at home.
Analyzing the spaces between home and school thus can illuminate how people function both outside and within the spaces of home
and school, and why they might do so. Considering these spaces also
can reveal much about the law’s role in constructing the poles that define them: the poles of home and school. Investigations of what
makes the space between home and school different from either home
or school may lead to clarification of what is at stake in both the home
and the school spaces. As such, explicitly considering this previously
neglected space can shed light on what lies beneath the legal construction of childrearing authority within the home and at school.
What would it mean to expand the existing functional approach
to the family by exploring how family law views, and should view,
childrearing that takes place outside of the traditional contexts of
home and school, by actors who are neither parents nor teachers? As
previously discussed, when childrearing is performed by parents in the
home, it is often enveloped by common law and constitutional notions
of privacy. What happens to that privacy when childrearing is outsourced? Does privacy attach to the childrearing function and travel
outside of the home? Or does privacy stay within the home, attaching
to childrearing only to the extent it is performed within the private,
domestic sphere? If the latter is true, may the state intervene and
regulate the childrearing function, much as it does in schools? Or
should the spaces between home and school be analogized to neither
home nor school, and be viewed instead as distinct spaces requiring
more tailored legal approaches?

165

Cf. Judith Warner, Loosen the Apron Strings, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 2006, at A21 (discussing how many parents are not sending their children to summer camps because
they want their children at home, and how “some parents even question whether those
who send their children away for extended camps ‘really love their kids’”). In addition, the law’s focus on the privacy of the home could encourage those parents who
can afford it to hire nannies and housekeepers to take care of their children, instead of
relying on caregivers outside of the home. Although such actors are generally presumed not to provide the same type of care as parents, their operation within the
home means that parents can dictate their childrearing practices free from state intervention. See supra text accompanying notes 124-126. Accordingly, the care provided
by nannies and housekeepers is outside the scope of this Article’s focus on childrearing between home and school.
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B. Current Controversies Between Home and School
Thinking about childrearing that occurs between home and
school is more than an academic exercise. Parents have increasingly
sought to exert control over activities that take place in these contested spaces. Because no settled doctrine governs such claims, the
results are often inconsistent. Exploring these inconsistencies can
highlight what is at stake in the spaces between home and school and
can help explain the ways in which analogies to home and school often fail to consider all pertinent interests.
Many attempts to extend parental authority beyond the home
suggest a vision of parenting and childrearing that hinges on control
of one’s child, regardless of location. Parents seek to control the messages to which their children are exposed in the spaces between home
and the classroom, as well as to control their children’s very presence
in those spaces. Such control has been valued as a way to foster diversity and pluralism; children are “not the mere creature of the state,”
but also are influenced by their parents, who reflect the pluralistic na166
ture of our society. In addition, many commentators have defended
broad notions of parental control by arguing that those with the greatest stake and investment in a child should oversee the child’s devel167
168
opment.
To permit the state, or others, to intervene in the par-

166

Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925); see also Buss, supra note 3,
at 32 (stating that parents’ “developmental competence” should be favored over the
state’s competence “in the interest of pluralism and experimentation”); Davis, supra
note 110, at 1371 (arguing that parents must be given the right to “embrace, act upon,
and advocate privately chosen values”).
167
For examples of this argument, see Emily Buss, Adrift in the Middle: Parental
Rights After Troxel v. Granville, 2000 SUP. CT. REV. 279, 284-90; John E. Coons, Intellectual Liberty and the Schools, 1 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 495, 505-10 (1985);
Stephen G. Gilles, On Educating Children: A Parentalist Manifesto, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 937,
940-41 (1996); Elizabeth S. Scott, Parental Autonomy and Children’s Welfare, 11 WM. &
MARY BILL RTS. J. 1071, 1077-79 (2003); Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, Parents as
Fiduciaries, 81 VA. L. REV. 2401, 2415 (1995).
168
These arguments favoring parental control also are made with respect to limiting the rights of third parties, such as grandparents, to intervene in the parent-child
relationship. See, e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 70 (2000) (“[T]he decision
whether . . . an intergenerational relationship would be beneficial in any specific case
is for the parent to make in the first instance.”); Buss, supra note 167, at 284-90 (exploring the appropriate degree of deference to parental decisions); Scott, Parental
Autonomy, supra note 167, at 1097-98 (discussing the potential negative effects on parents and children that could be caused by “the legal recognition of third party custody
and visitation claims”). But see Bartlett, supra note 11, at 961-63 (arguing that the state
should recognize multiple parents when a child has developed child-parent relationships outside of the traditional nuclear family); Meyer, supra note 2, at 586-87 (arguing
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ent-child relationship would decrease incentives for parents to invest
169
in their children, thereby reducing family intimacy and shifting
childrearing responsibility away from those who are considered to be
most competent to raise the child, because of daily interaction and
the knowledge and emotional connections that flow from that inter170
action.
These justifications for parental control have traditionally been
deployed to argue against state interference in the family. Families
are a site of diversity and pluralism largely because they are permitted
171
to operate outside of the zone of state power; hence, the state can172
not “standardize its children.”
Implicit in such arguments is the assumption that families function primarily in the private realm of the
home. If this were not the case, families could be exposed to the taint
of state power.
Recent attempts to extend parental authority outside of the home
challenge this assumption, demanding that parental control over
173
children be protected even in the public realm.
Pursuant to this
view, family privacy is not limited to the home but rather attaches to
the childrearing function, even when that function is performed outside of the home or is performed by parental surrogates. Family law’s
neglect of the spaces between home and school could be interpreted
as supporting such a view. Indeed, such neglect could be the natural
product of a normative view that all nonstate childrearing should be

that some of parents’ decision-making authority should give way to the state’s interest
in maintaining children’s ongoing relationships with extended family members).
169
See, e.g., Ferdinand Schoeman, Rights of Children, Rights of Parents, and the Moral
Basis of the Family, 91 ETHICS 6, 17 (1980) (“[R]egulation transforms relationships into
less intimate ones.”).
170
See, e.g., Emily Buss, Essay, “Parental” Rights, 88 VA. L. REV. 635, 647 (2002) (advocating deference to parental decisions because parents are “the child-specific experts most qualified to assess and pursue their children’s best interests in most circumstances”).
171
See supra text accompanying notes 117-126.
172
Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925).
173
Some parents have even gone so far as to argue that their childrearing authority entitles them to control the curriculum of public schools. For the most part, however, these claims have been unsuccessful. See supra note 132 (listing cases where parents’ views were not permitted to trump the views of school officials); see also Elk Grove
Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 15-18 (2004) (rejecting a noncustodial parent’s challenge to the content of the Pledge of Allegiance, which was recited at his
daughter’s school, because the parent’s custodial status rendered him without standing
to assert the claim). This Article focuses solely on parental attempts to extend their
authority in the spaces between home and school—areas where relatively little law currently exists.
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subsumed within the sphere of family privacy—controlled by private
ordering and unregulated by the state.
Despite strong arguments in favor of parental control in general,
family law scholars have not articulated a rationale for extending that
control outside of the home and into public realms short of the
schoolhouse door. Moreover, courts have been largely unsympathetic
to parents’ claims that state regulation of various spaces between
home and school interferes with their right to rear their children. In174
stead, as discussed in more detail below, courts have in fact permitted the state to regulate many of the spaces between home and school.
These situations thus provide insight into the current limits of parental power, challenging the view that family law scholars have been silent about childrearing between home and school because it is obvious that parents should control such childrearing.
In some situations, it is not surprising that courts have permitted
states to limit parental prerogatives, because parents have sought to
extend their authority to realms long considered to be part of the
175
state’s domain.
For example, nudist parents in Texas invoked Dale
to argue that a local law permitting adults to sunbathe nude in a
county park, but excluding all children from the park, interfered with
their right to teach their children the values of the nudist, or “natur176
ist,” lifestyle.
The state court disagreed, emphasizing that the state
has an interest in regulating all activity, including childrearing activity,
that occurs on state land. The court concluded that the law at issue
constituted a permissible regulation, because “[t]he rules do not affect the ability of . . . naturist parents to associate with their children,
177
but regulate only where such associations may occur.” The court also
distinguished Dale by emphasizing the different manner of childrearing employed by the nudists:
While appellants and the Boy Scouts may share a common goal to instill
values in children, the manner in which these values are transmitted is
distinguishable. The Boy Scouts, as an organization, seeks to transfer its
174

See infra notes 176-192 and accompanying text.
These cases are thus analogous to cases where parents have unsuccessfully
sought to control public school curricula. See supra notes 132, 173.
176
Cent. Tex. Nudists v. County of Travis, No. 03-00-00024-CV, 2000 WL 1784344,
at *1 (Tex. Ct. App. Dec. 7, 2000).
177
Id. at *4 (emphasis added). The court analogized this case to City of Dallas v.
Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19 (1989), in which the U.S. Supreme Court upheld an ordinance
barring minors from certain dance halls; the court also cited Runyon as support for the
assertion that parental rights are not absolute, but rather are subject to some regulation. Cent. Tex. Nudists, 2000 WL 1784344, at *3-4.
175
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values to its members by “having its adult leaders spend time with the
youth members, instructing and engaging them in activities like camping, archery, and fishing.” In contrast, appellants seek to convey their
values to their children by engaging in swimming, sunbathing, and other
forms of recreation in the nude at McGregor Park. Of critical importance to appellants is not the activity itself, but rather, the manner in
178
which the activity is conducted—in the nude and in public.

Other attempts to extend parental authority beyond the home
present closer questions, yet courts still have upheld state regulations
limiting parental authority in such cases. Most notably, parents have
been largely unsuccessful in challenging local curfew ordinances, even
though such ordinances can substitute the views of the state for parents’ own views of when and where their children should be able to
travel. These decisions seem to be motivated by the state’s interests in
protecting the safety of children, making the curfew laws similar to
other state involvement that occurs upon family default. In particular,
courts seem to question why parents would permit their children to
leave the home at night. As one court has stated, parents’ right to direct the upbringing of their children “does not extend to . . . unilaterally determin[ing] when and if children will be on the streets—
certainly at night. That is not among the ‘intimate family decisions’
179
encompassed by such a right.”
In the end, however, such holdings
may not reveal much about the scope of parental power, because most

178

Cent. Tex. Nudists, 2000 WL 1784344, at *5 (citation omitted) (quoting Boy
Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 649 (2000)). A similar rationale would likely apply
to attempts by parents to exert control over childrearing in other public spaces, such as
municipal swimming pools or public libraries.
179
Hutchins v. District of Columbia, 188 F.3d 531, 541 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (en banc)
(plurality opinion) (quoting and discussing Schleifer v. City of Charlottesville, 159 F.3d
843, 853 (4th Cir. 1998), which stated that “[t]he Charlottesville ordinance, prohibiting young children from remaining unaccompanied on the streets late at night, simply
does not implicate the kinds of intimate family decisions considered in the above
cases”). But Chief Judge Edwards, concurring in Hutchins, resisted the comparison to
state involvement upon family default, emphasizing that
when the Government does intervene in the rearing of children without regard to parents’ preferences, “it is usually in response to some significant
breakdown within the family unit or in the complete absence of parental caretaking,” or to enforce a norm that is critical to the health, safety, or welfare of
minors. The difficult question, then, is how to accommodate both the state’s
interests and parents’ rights where there has been no specific finding of a
breakdown within an identified family unit and there is no indisputable threat
to the health, safety, or welfare of minors.
Id. at 550-51 (Edwards, C.J., concurring) (citation omitted) (quoting Action for Children’s Television v. FCC, 58 F.3d 654, 679 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (Edwards, C.J., dissenting)).
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curfew ordinances have been upheld on the theory that their restrictions coincide with the presumed intent of most parents and contain
180
adequate exceptions to accommodate parental wishes.
Indeed, curfew laws have been struck down as a violation of parental rights only
181
when they were extremely broad and contained limited exceptions.
182
Another case, White Tail Park, Inc. v. Stroube, seems much more
at odds with notions of parental authority, particularly the type of deference to parental prerogatives that could be seen as underlying the
holding in Dale. In 2004, the state of Virginia amended its summer
camp licensing law. The amendment requires the state department of
health to deny any license application made by a “nudist camp for juveniles,” which is defined to be any camp where juveniles attend
openly in the nude and are not accompanied by a parent, grandpar183
ent, or guardian.
As recounted in subsequent litigation, the
amendment was passed after a nudist organization operated a weeklong juvenile nudist camp at a private nudist campground in the state
in 2003. The camp offered traditional summer camp activities, along
with “an educational component designed to teach the values associated with social nudism through topics such as ‘Nudity and the Law,’
‘Overcoming the Clothing Experience,’ ‘Puberty Rights Versus Pu184
berty Wrongs,’ and ‘Nudism and Faith.’”
Seeking to operate a similar camp in 2004, but facing the new amendment, the organization,
the campground, and three sets of parents sued the state department
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Indeed, in Hutchins, the majority found that the D.C. curfew was constitutional
because the ordinance reinforced parental authority; no restrictions were imposed on
juveniles’ activities if the minors were accompanied by a parent or by an adult authorized by the parent. Hutchins, 188 F.3d at 545. Moreover, parents could allow their
children to run errands during curfew hours, and juveniles could attend official
school, religious, or other civic activities. See id. (analogizing to Ginsberg v. New York,
390 U.S. 629, 639 (1968), where a state regulation prohibiting the sale of pornographic magazines to minors contained an exception that permitted parents to buy the
magazines for their children); see also Qutb v. Strauss, 11 F.3d 488, 493-95 (5th Cir.
1993) (finding a youth curfew constitutional because it was narrowly tailored).
181
See Nunez v. City of San Diego, 114 F.3d 935, 946-49 (9th Cir. 1997) (finding a
youth curfew unconstitutional because “it does not provide exceptions for many legitimate activities, with or without parental permission”); Johnson v. City of Opelousas,
658 F.2d 1065, 1071-74 (5th Cir. Unit A Oct. 1981) (striking a curfew with no exemption for school activities, religious meetings, entertainment events, or athletic pursuits); State v. J.P., 907 So. 2d 1101, 1117-19 (Fla. 2004) (holding that a curfew ordinance was unconstitutional because it made minors’ conduct illegal even when they
had the permission of their parents to be on the streets after curfew hours).
182
413 F.3d 451 (4th Cir. 2005).
183
VA. CODE ANN. § 35.1-18 (2005).
184
White Tail, 413 F.3d at 455.
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of health, challenging the validity of the amendment. Specifically, the
complaint asserted that the amendment violated the “plaintiffs’ right
to privacy and to control the education and rearing of their children
under the Fourteenth Amendment; and . . . [their] First Amendment
185
right to free association.”
As such, White Tail is like Dale, but with the family privacy claims
explicitly alleged. The plaintiffs have not challenged the general licensing of summer camps, which can be justified on public health
and safety grounds. Rather, the plaintiffs have objected to the state’s
interference with the nudist camp’s operations. It is hardly controversial that one of the primary purposes of any summer camp is to provide children with an escape from their parents (and vice versa) dur186
ing the summer.
To deny this opportunity to nudists who wish to
communicate the values—and practices—of nudism to children on
private land seems to interfere with the rights of parents and parental
surrogates to engage in the childrearing of their choice.
It is unclear, however, whether courts will afford the nudist organization and parents the same deference that was afforded to the
Boy Scouts, even though both cases involve attempts to instill values in
young people. The federal district court denied the plaintiffs a preliminary injunction and dismissed the case as moot after the nudist
187
organization cancelled the 2004 camp. The Fourth Circuit reversed
in part, holding that the claims brought by the nudist organization
188
and the nudist campground were not moot, but that only the nudist
189
organization, and not the campground, had standing.
Both the organization and the campground had “asserted injuries to the organi190
zations themselves,” but only the organization provided evidence
showing how the amendment would harm its interests in educating

185

Id. at 456.
Indeed, one of the sets of parents in White Tail explained that they challenged
the amended statute because they believed the nudist camp “experience would be
more valuable if [the children] were able to spend the week away from us.” Id. at 45758 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Warner, supra note 165, at A21 (remarking that her child was “truly fortunate” to be away from her while at summer camp).
187
White Tail, 413 F.3d at 456.
188
The Fourth Circuit held that the claims brought by the nudist organization and
the nudist campground continued to present a live controversy because the two entities operated the camp in 2003 “with the expectation that it would become an annual
event,” and the organization subsequently applied for a permit to hold the camp at the
campground in 2005. Id. at 457 (internal quotation marks omitted).
189
Id. at 459-62.
190
Id. at 459 (emphasis omitted).
186
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“nudist youth and inculcat[ing] them with the values and traditions
that are unique to the culture and history of the . . . American social
191
nudist movement” by reducing the size of the camp.
The Fourth
Circuit upheld the finding of mootness with respect to the parents’
claims, because nothing in the record indicated that the particular
plaintiffs intended to enroll their children in the camp in any subse192
quent summer.
The district court now must consider the merits of the nudist organization’s claims. The holding in Dale would seem to suggest that
the nudist organization should be permitted to operate largely outside
the zone of state power and hence be exempt from the amendment.
Indeed, the nudist camp seems to resemble Boy Scout camps
throughout the nation. However, the Virginia state legislature passed
its amendment well after Dale was decided. Virginia clearly believed
that it had a legitimate interest in limiting minors’ access to nudist
teachings outside of the presence of their parents. The district court
very well could conclude that nudity alone is sufficient to distinguish
the case from Dale, a conclusion that could be supported by precedent
where parents were declared unfit, in part because they took their
minor children to nudist camps or were otherwise involved with nud193
ist colonies.
Yet nudist practices by themselves have not constituted
sufficient parental default to justify state intervention in the home in

191

Id. at 461 (internal quotation marks omitted). The court stated that the size of
the camp would likely be reduced “because not all would-be campers have parents or
guardians who are available to register and attend a week of camp during the summer.” Id.
192
Id. at 457-58.
193
See, e.g., Fish v. Fish, Jr., 881 A.2d 342, 346-47 (Conn. App. Ct. 2005) (upholding lower court’s denial of custody to father because, in part, he made inappropriate
and suggestive comments, “walked around the house in an open bathrobe exposing his
genitals in [the child’s] presence and . . . joked about going to a nudist colony with
her”); William S.V., Jr. v. Ann S.V., No. CN90-7921, 1991 WL 275151, at *7, *12 (Del.
Fam. Ct. Oct. 28, 1991) (identifying the father’s attendance at nudist colonies as a factor in determining the best interests of the child, and ultimately awarding primary custody to the mother, who had previously served as the primary caregiver); Jankowski v.
Jankowski, No. 258466, 2005 WL 1185611, at *1 (Mich. Ct. App. May 19, 2005) (concluding that an extended family member “would not be an appropriate father figure”
for a mother’s children because he was “abusive and belittling,” failed to understand
the seriousness of the children’s problems, and took one of the children to a nudist
colony several times); Barr v. Barr, No. 207014, 1999 WL 33437891, at *1 (Mich. Ct.
App. Aug. 13, 1999) (upholding lower court order prohibiting father from taking child
to any nudist facility during visitation periods).
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194

other cases.
Is nudity sufficient to distinguish White Tail from Dale
and to justify state regulation limiting the authority of parents to control childrearing outside of the home, in private spaces between home
and school?
Another Supreme Court decision may provide some guidance,
while also highlighting the often inconsistent approach taken in cases
involving childrearing disputes outside the traditional scope of family
law. In Ashcroft v. ACLU, the Court enjoined enforcement of a federal
statute designed to protect minors from exposure to sexually explicit
material on the Internet because the government failed to show that
the statute’s approach was superior to alternative means that would
195
infringe less on adults’ access to Internet content. Therefore, as was
the case in Dale, the Court held that state regulation was impermissible. Here, however, the regulation could be viewed as supporting parental authority; groups of parents had enlisted the state to help them
limit their children’s Internet access. In contrast to Dale, the holding
in Ashcroft refused to defer to the prerogatives of these parents or of
their surrogates. Rather, the Court permitted the First Amendment
rights of adults, as a general group, to trump the desires of those par196
ents who wished to limit their children’s Internet activity. The holding is particularly striking from a family law perspective because the
statute was designed, in large part, to help parents control the mes197
sages their children receive via the Internet within the home.
Cyberspace is therefore carved out from the space of the home, and different rules apply.

194

See Hadley v. Cox, 470 So. 2d 735, 736-37 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (reversing
restrictions on a child’s ability to visit her mother’s home at a nudist camp because her
father failed to prove that the nudist park was detrimental to the child’s welfare).
195
542 U.S. 656, 666-70 (2004).
196
This reading of Ashcroft is based on the Court’s emphasis on the various ways
the regulation would impede adults’ First Amendment rights. See id. at 667. Another
potential way to look at the holding in Ashcroft is to view the regulation as infringing on
the rights of parents who want their children to enjoy wide Internet access. But even
this view of Ashcroft conflicts with the holding in Dale, because the Dale court never
considered how the Boy Scouts’s views conformed to, or conflicted with, the views of
New Jersey parents who permitted their children to be Boy Scouts. See supra notes 101102 and accompanying text.
197
As one commentator has stated, “the widespread availability of [indecent] material in the larger society makes it virtually impossible for parents to act effectively on
their own. Instead, if parents are to have meaningful rights in this area, the community must have the power to regulate the manner in which such material is distributed.” Steven J. Heyman, Ideological Conflict and the First Amendment, 78 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 531, 608 (2003).
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Like the outcome in Dale, then, the fate of the nudist summer
camps could depend on one court’s view of the proper analogy.
Camps—even those on private land—could be viewed as similar to cyberspace: a realm where societal norms trump parental prerogatives.
This approach, however, could cast doubt on the holding in Dale; for
if Virginia has a legitimate interest in limiting the manner in which
teenagers may live the nudist lifestyle at nudist summer camps on private land, presumably promoting the values of modesty outside of the
198
home, then New Jersey arguably has a legitimate interest in promoting the values of nondiscrimination at places of public accommodation like the Boy Scouts. Analogizing the camps to the home would
eliminate this incompatibility. Consistent with Dale, parental authority
could be extended outside of the home to protect the camps as entities functioning as parental surrogates. Nonetheless, the differing levels of deference to the prerogatives of parents and their surrogates
expressed in Ashcroft and Dale would remain.
For the most part, family law scholars have not theorized what
should happen in cases like White Tail, due to their general neglect of
childrearing between home and school. Although this neglect could
be interpreted as reflecting a normative default of parental control in
all spaces but school, courts have not embraced that view. Instead, as
the cases discussed above indicate, courts have at times extended parental control and at other times thwarted it. This doctrinal inconsistency is significant for family law as a whole, and even for those family
law scholars who do not wish to explore childrearing between home
and school, because such inconsistency reveals much about the current contours of family privacy.
The cases discussed above signal a partial rejection of the privacy
traditionally thought to be afforded to families. Instead of deferring
to parents, the cases reveal that courts often permit the state to regulate childrearing that concerns sex and other issues of morality. Even
the curfew cases could be viewed as state attempts to limit minors’ opportunities to engage in sex, drinking, drug use, and other nighttime
activities. The boundaries of family privacy are thus constructed not
by respect for parental prerogatives, but by the views of states and

198

Although the Virginia statute does permit minors to attend nudist summer
camps if they are accompanied by a parent or other legal guardian, that requirement,
in effect, prevents the camp from operating, because fundamental to the definition of
“camp” is the provision of places where children spend time away from their parents.
See supra note 186 and accompanying text.
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199

courts regarding appropriate sexual conduct.
When childrearing
conforms to those views, family privacy is respected. When childrearing challenges those views, family privacy ends.
The location of childrearing matters in this construction of family
privacy. If the childrearing activities at issue in the above cases had
taken place in the family home, the state would not have been permitted to regulate them or to intervene in any other manner, unless the
200
activities amounted to abuse or neglect. Because the childrearing in
the above cases took place outside of the home, however, the existence of abuse or neglect was not even litigated. Instead, in most instances, courts weighed the state’s interests in the challenged regulation against the parents’ interests in directing the upbringing of their
children. Childrearing was not permitted to exist outside the zone of
state power, where it generally exists when performed within the
201
home; rather, it was subject to the state’s views regarding appropriate childrearing.
Such balancing between the interests of the state and parents also
occurs when parents challenge state educational regulations governing schools. In those instances, however, the state interest is clear:
202
the education of future citizens.
In the cases concerning childrearing between home and school, the state’s interests are often less clear,
and there is little legal precedent evaluating those interests. As illus203
trated above, analogies to previously recognized forms of childrearing—analogies to childrearing at home or school—often do not provide sufficient guidance to courts, because childrearing between
home and school can be distinct from that performed at home or

199

Cf. Dailey, supra note 49, at 956 (“Far from prohibiting state intervention in a
prepolitical social sphere, the ideal of family privacy expresses a particular set of family
values by protecting only those social relations that the state deems worth protecting.”). Other scholars have made a similar point with respect to the state’s role in defining family. See, e.g., MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION,
EXCLUSION, AND AMERICAN LAW 276 (1990) (“Rather than marking a boundary limiting state intervention in the family, laws governing the family define the kinds of families the state approves.”).
200
Of course, abuse and neglect can be defined in different ways, and definitions
can be particularly expansive if states do not approve of the family form in question.
See supra note 120 (discussing the work of Dorothy Roberts and Martha Fineman,
among others, which reveals that families of color and poor, single mothers are afforded much less privacy than other families). Unlike the cases discussed here, however, the state claims the existence of abuse or neglect before it intervenes.
201
See supra notes 119-123 and accompanying text.
202
See supra notes 131-137 and accompanying text.
203
See supra Part II.
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school, by parents or teachers. Analytical and normative incoherence
can thus result, calling into question the parameters of family privacy.
C. The Beginnings of a Theory of Childrearing
Between Home and School
A broader normative view about the interests at stake when childrearing takes place at locations other than home and school could go
a long way toward providing a more consistent approach to family privacy, and toward clarifying whether and why location should matter in
determining the respect accorded to that privacy. The remainder of
this Article sets forth one possible normative approach that could
guide courts and others confronted with childrearing between home
and school. This discussion also hopes to spur future conversation
about the meanings of privacy and pluralism within family law as a
whole.
The analysis in this Article supports the conclusion that family law
should ensure that the spaces between home and school remain vital
locations of children’s development and an integral part of civil soci204
ety.
One way to achieve this goal is for family law scholars to develop a theory of childrearing that: first, acknowledges the myriad
ways that children are socialized outside of school and family; second,
explores the ways such childrearing can expose children to diverse
ways of life, thereby creating pluralism within the family as well as
without; and finally, promotes such pluralism by permitting childrearing between home and school to operate largely free from state control, subject only to limited, inclusion-oriented regulations.
Explicitly acknowledging childrearing between home and school
is a necessary first step in redressing family law’s neglect of this sphere
of childrearing. In this inquiry, location is primarily a threshold issue,
or a means to identify a range of childrearing practices that are not
currently addressed by the existing scope of family law. Once the
practices are identified, the actual location of the practices matters

204

This Article adopts a broad definition of civil society, specifically that articulated by Jean Cohen and Andrew Arato, who define “civil society” as “a sphere of social
interaction between economy and state, composed above all of the intimate sphere
(especially the family), the sphere of associations (especially voluntary associations),
social movements, and forms of public communication.” COHEN & ARATO, supra note
164, at ix. For a brief discussion of disagreements about the proper scope of civil society, see Mark Tushnet, The Constitution of Civil Society, 75 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 379, 381 n.9
(2000).
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much less than do the actors who engage in the socialization of children in those spaces—and the functions they serve.
Acknowledging childrearing between home and school therefore
means acknowledging the ways that many children are socialized not
just by parents and teachers, but also by many other actors. As dis205
cussed earlier in Part I, the identities of these actors vary from child to
child in ways that often correlate to race, class, geography, religion,
gender, or parental preference. The important common denominator,
however, is that these actors are neither the children’s parents nor their
teachers. This difference matters to children. The social science literature indicates that children perceive these actors to be different from
teachers or parents, and, as a result, children respond to them differ206
ently.
The current scope of family law implies that this difference is
one of lack of influence—that exposure to these actors is not important
to child socialization. A theory that acknowledges childrearing between
home and school could examine the full range of this difference in any
given situation, from lack of influence to reinforcement of parental authority to the positing of alternative ways of life. Moreover, these actors
often engage in different types of childrearing than do parents or
teachers, frequently conveying information about the practices and
preferences of the community and various subcommunities in which
children live. Instead of conveying information about a particular family’s values, as parents often do, or conveying substantive knowledge and
information about the requirements of democratic citizenship, as
teachers often do, the actors between home and school convey information about the values of people and organizations existing outside of
individual families but not subsumed by the state. This information
may overlap with information about community values conveyed by
parents and teachers, but it will often be different.
Such transmission of community values may seem obvious, given
the Boy Scouts’s repeated statements in the Dale litigation that the or207
ganization seeks to instill values in young people.
The Supreme
Court’s analysis, however, focused on the organization’s ability to convey its message, not on how that message was received by its youth
members. In fact, the Supreme Court did not consider the interests
of the boys of the Boy Scouts at all, instead evaluating the case as one

205
206
207

See supra text accompanying notes 34-38.
See supra text accompanying notes 38-39.
See supra text accompanying notes 75-83.
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that pitted a private adult association against the state.
The Court
overlooked the actual messages that the boys may have received from
the Boy Scouts, or the ways the boys may have been affected by those
messages. Family law need not continue this neglect.
After acknowledging childrearing between home and school, family law scholars can explore how this childrearing relates to the tradition of pluralism within family law. Scholars have long explored, and
often extolled, the role families play “in maintaining the diverse moral
values and traditions that comprise the pluralist foundation of our
liberal political order, values and traditions that in turn serve to
counter the threat that unmediated state power poses to moral diver209
sity.” Indeed, the desire for such pluralism is a primary justification
210
for respecting family privacy and parental control.
Pluralism currently exists only between families, however. Our society is pluralistic because many types of families are permitted to exist
largely free from state indoctrination. In contrast, pluralism rarely exists within families. Children are generally exposed to just one belief
211
system within the family, or at most two.
Therefore, although chil212
dren may not be standardized by the state, they often are standardized within their own families. Pluralism may exist on a broad, societal level, but children rarely experience pluralism on a micro level,
within their own families.
208

See supra text accompanying notes 66-75.
Dailey, supra note 49, at 958-59; see also MCCLAIN, supra note 5, at 82 (discussing
how “[f]amilies may function as . . . enclaves that can work out and nurture alternative
conceptions of self, community, and justice”); Davis, supra note 110, at 1371 (“People
are not meant to be socialized to uniform, externally imposed values. People are able
to form families and other intimate communities within which children might be differently socialized . . . .”); Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARV. L. REV. 737,
786-87 (1989) (describing the mandatory public schooling law in Pierce as one that “potentially subjected these individuals to a narrowly directed existence”).
210
See supra text accompanying note 166; see also Dailey, supra note 49, at 1023
(“The family is subject to constitutional protection, therefore, not because it is an
arena of negative liberty, as conventional wisdom would have it, but because it serves
both to deploy and to constrain the political power of the state.”).
211
Each child is given just one family, but divorce or other factors may lead parents to convey two, often divergent, belief systems to their children. See, e.g., ELIZABETH MARQUARDT, BETWEEN TWO WORLDS: THE INNER LIVES OF CHILDREN OF DIVORCE 84-85 (2005) (explaining that young adults from divorced families rarely
perceived their parents’ values as unified or complementary); Minow, All in the Family,
supra note 155, at 288-97 (presenting a general discussion of diversity within families
during marriage and postdivorce situations); Volokh, supra note 21, at 692-97 (discussing circumstances that can arise after divorce, under which parents may teach different
ideologies to children).
212
See Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925).
209
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Childrearing between home and school can expose children to
other ways of life, thereby making the promise of pluralism more meaningful to children. Children, of course, are still steeped in the traditions of their parents when they interact in the spaces between home
and school, but they are also exposed to alternative viewpoints, different ways of living as children, and diverse models for adult life. Other
family law scholars have emphasized that children benefit from such
exposure because it enables them to later make informed choices about
how they wish to live their adult lives. Most of these scholars, however,
call on the state to ensure that children are exposed to these mes213
sages.
The analysis in this Article suggests that exposure may be better achieved by fostering pluralism in the spaces between home and
school. Such pluralism could serve as an antidote to both state dogma
and the standardization that can occur within the family.
The final element of a theory of childrearing between home and
school therefore must ask whether the state should intervene to foster
or restrain childrearing between home and school, or whether, consistent with the outcome in Dale, the state should leave those spaces unregulated, permitting parents and nonstate entities to engage in the
childrearing practices of their choice with neither support nor discouragement from the state. This Article suggests that the answer lies
somewhere in between. Given the traditional emphasis on pluralism
in family law, state regulation seems undesirable because it risks imposing a narrow, state-sanctioned view of childrearing upon the spaces
between home and school, potentially infringing on parents’ ability to
convey their own values to their children. Indeed, such an approach
would, in many instances, give the state some measure of control over
more than half of children’s everyday lives. However, if family law also
cares about fostering pluralism within the family, then nonregulation
also seems undesirable, because it would cede childrearing between
home and school to the control of parents and their surrogates. Im-

213

See, e.g., MCCLAIN, supra note 5, at 79-80 (“[T]oleration should not extend
to . . . systems of family governance that would replicate” intolerant or oppressive
worldviews); Dena S. Davis, The Child’s Right to an Open Future: Yoder and Beyond, 26
CAP. U. L. REV. 93, 93-97 (1997) (defending, in qualified terms, the right of the state to
intervene when “parents . . . make choices for their children that dramatically limit the
children’s possibilities for an open future”); Dolgin, supra note 18, at 383-88 (contending that Yoder did not rest on a general right of parents to shield their children from
the broader culture); Woodhouse, supra note 48, at 1117-22 (arguing that, while
“[n]either the state nor the parent owns” children, “each must genuinely love them
and take responsibility for their future”).
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portant opportunities to expose children to the diversity of the
broader civil society would therefore be lost.
Accordingly, a broad conception of pluralism can best be served
by permitting childrearing between home and school to operate
largely free from state control, subject only to limited inclusion214
oriented, or pluralism-enhancing, regulations.
Actors engaged in
childrearing between home and school, such as the Boy Scouts or the
White Tail Park summer camp, would be permitted to engage in the
childrearing of their choice, much as parents are permitted—and
even encouraged—to do. But because the space between home and
school often provides the most meaningful opportunities for children
to experience pluralism, these actors would not be permitted to oper215
ate completely outside the zone of state power.
Rather, the state
should intervene in a limited way to ensure that the actors do not
thwart the potential of these spaces to expose children to diverse ways
of life within the broader civil society.
In the context of the Dale litigation, this normative approach
would mean that the Boy Scouts would not be permitted to exclude
Dale as a troop leader, because the state of New Jersey has decided, in
passing its public accommodations law, that discrimination against
homosexuals in spaces like the Boy Scouts is at odds with the state’s
conception of civil society. The state therefore has affirmed that it
supports the type of pluralism articulated here. Moreover, application
of the public accommodations law would serve the approach’s pluralism-enhancing goals by exposing boys to multiple ways to live as
216
men. The Boy Scouts, of course, loses a considerable amount of pri214

Church and other religious activities are exempted from this analysis, given the
unique First Amendment protections extended to those activities. I hope to consider
church-based childrearing in future work.
215
Cf. MCCLAIN, supra note 5, at 27 (“Civil society is not a realm free of governmental regulation.”). Thus, the spaces between home and school would resist easy
classification as part of either the public or private realms. The spaces would not be
subject to full regulation as part of the public sphere, but they would not be exempt
from regulation as part of the private sphere either. As such, many of the downsides of
state regulation could potentially be avoided. For an account of these downsides in
different contexts, see Katherine M. Franke, Taking Care, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1541,
1544-54 (2001).
216
Andrew Koppelman has emphasized that gay children, both in and out of the
Boy Scouts, could benefit from the application of New Jersey’s public accommodations
law in this context, particularly if their parents are not open to embracing homosexuality within the family. See Andrew Koppelman, Should Noncommercial Associations Have an
Absolute Right To Discriminate?, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 2004, at 27, 43-47.
But other children could benefit as well. Children who have previously received only
limited messages about homosexuality could benefit; children who will eventually work
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vacy under this theory, because the organization would no longer be
exempt from state public accommodations laws. This loss, however, is
solely a function of the Supreme Court’s allocation of more privacy to
the Boy Scouts than to other private associations, such as the Jaycees,
which are already subject to state public accommodations laws.
The theory articulated here, in contrast, views organizations like
the Boy Scouts as particularly worthy of being subject to state public
accommodations laws, because the Boy Scouts is a private association
engaged in childrearing. Private associations are generally not permitted to operate outside of the zone of state power. Indeed, as the
Supreme Court opinion in Jaycees makes clear, private associations are
subject to limited state regulation even when adults’ interests are the
only interests at stake. It seems counterintuitive to relax such regulations when children’s interests also are at stake, given that the state
has an interest in modeling diverse behavior to children, in preparation for their future roles in civil society.
In the context of the White Tail litigation, this normative approach
would mean that the state could not enact regulations, such as the
one at issue in that case, that, in effect, prevent the camp from engaging in its desired form of childrearing. Some may question whether
this outcome actually supports the goal of pluralism, given that children who attend nudist camps most likely have nudist parents. However, the approach articulated here does not mandate that children
be exposed to ways of life that are radically different from their parents’ ways of life (and, presumably, children of nudists are already exposed to the clothed lifestyle at school and in various commercial
spaces). Rather, the spaces between home and school can also expose
children to different ways of living within their parents’ tradition. If
nudists are like most groups, there is likely much diversity even within
the group.
Some parents, like the parents in White Tail, likely will welcome
the opportunity for their children to engage in such pluralismenhancing activities. Although family law scholarship frequently extols parental control, many parents might find that they need or want

and live with gays and lesbians could benefit; and all children could benefit from a
broader notion of how to perform one’s gender and live one’s sexual life. Indeed,
both boys and girls may feel particularly limited by narrow constructions of gender and
sexuality, and they often can benefit from exposure to alternative ways to live as men
and women in this world. See, e.g., Gagen, supra note 31, at 214-15 (discussing the work
of Judith Butler); see also sources cited supra note 88 (analyzing the harm caused by institutions that inculcate rigid gender roles).
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support from nonstate actors in the often overwhelming task of shap217
ing young lives.
By explicitly acknowledging childrearing between
home and school, and fostering such childrearing through pluralismenhancing regulation and nonregulation, the theory proposed here—
in contrast to the Dale opinion—would affirm that the responsibilities
of childrearing need not be shouldered solely in private, but rather
can be a vital part of the broader civil society. The theory thus could
support parents while still respecting their prerogatives.
Other parents may be opposed to pluralism-enhancing activities.
The theory articulated here does not intrude on the prerogatives of
these parents, either. Rather, pursuant to existing notions of family
privacy, parents still have a right to limit their children’s participation
in the spaces between home and school. Nothing in this Article attempts to change that right. But once parents permit their children
to participate in those spaces, there is no need for the law to view the
spaces as outside of the zone of state power. Rather, the law can ensure that the spaces between home and school remain vital locations
of children’s development by exposing children to diverse ways of life.
In this way, the law can promote pluralism both within the family and
without.
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A few family law scholars, most notably Dorothy Roberts and Clare Huntington,
have recently begun to call for a somewhat similar approach in the abuse and neglect
context. See Huntington, supra note 2, at 693 (defending the need to “reorient society’s views of abuse and neglect away from the view that [they] are products of parental
pathology, and toward a view . . . where a broader group . . . claims responsibility for
the larger circumstances that led to the abuse or neglect”); Dorothy E. Roberts, The
Community Dimension of State Child Protection, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 23, 27-35 (2005) (discussing the “community approach” to social work in child welfare cases). These scholars argue that abuse and neglect regimes in most states set up a false and unnecessary
choice between parental control and state involvement, particularly in cases of povertyrelated neglect as opposed to physical or sexual abuse. These scholars propose that,
instead of leaving parents alone until they default and then removing the children to
the custody of the state, the state should enlist the help of community members to devise case plans whereby children at risk of neglect can remain with their parents if they
receive support from community members. Such support can remedy immediate family problems, and the ties to the community that develop in the process of such problem solving can strengthen the family for the future. There is no reason to assume
that such community involvement can benefit only those parents at risk of committing
abuse or neglect. See, e.g., Sugarman, supra note 56, at 1 (“The key message is that
[most] parents need help, not only from extended family members and the community at large, but also from government.”). In addition, various studies show that families are much less likely to become subject to state abuse and neglect proceedings if
they have ties to the community. Huntington, supra note 2, at 680-81.
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CONCLUSION
Acknowledging and examining childrearing between home and
school can, without any further analysis, go a long way toward achieving family law’s goal of reflecting and supporting family life. The acknowledgment that such childrearing exists, that it is performed by
diverse actors previously unrecognized by family law, and that children often respond to it differently and receive different messages
than they do at home and school, will hopefully lead to a more robust
conception of child socialization within family law.
Such acknowledgement also can clarify what is at stake for family
law in the home and school spaces. The existing scope of family law
primarily defines home and school by relation to one another: home
is what school is not, and vice versa. This approach is consistent with
social science theories emphasizing that home is more than a spatial
218
description, but instead also exists as a conceptual category.
Nonetheless, such an expansive legal conception of home risks obscuring
the importance of the physical home and the activities that occur
therein. Similarly, an expansive conception of school can dilute the
state’s focus on educating future citizens. Acknowledging and examining the childrearing that occurs between home and school thus
could increase family law’s understanding of childrearing in all locations, including home and school.
Beyond better reflecting family life, such analysis can spur reconsideration of some of the fundamental normative positions of family
law as a whole. This Article has shown how analyzing childrearing between home and school can call into question family law’s existing
approaches to privacy and pluralism. By focusing on pluralism between
families, family law has often overlooked the ways that there is little to
no pluralism within families—largely because of family privacy. Indeed, family law scholars rarely have discussed what pluralism means
for individual family members, or how the promise of pluralism might
be made more meaningful for individual family members. This Article has proposed one way to address these questions, by showing how
the law’s recognition of childrearing between home and school could
increase children’s individual experiences of pluralism, while also preserving the family’s role in maintaining a diverse, pluralistic society.
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See, for example, the studies of home discussed in Christensen et al., supra
note 44, at 141-42.

